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ABSTRACT
MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THE CASE OF GREECE: 1952-1987
by C. KOLLIAS
Throughout the post-war period, Greece has allocated between 
five and six per cent of her annual Gross Domestic Product to 
defence. On many occasions she had the highest defence burden in 
NATO and Europe. There is evidence that the level, form and 
content of this defence expenditure have been determined by a 
combination of both external and internal factors. Greek military 
spending needs to be understood in relation to external security 
concerns and in particular in terms of her relations with Turkey. 
Membership of NATO, U.S. foreign policies and internal security 
factors have also influenced military expenditure. There is no 
substantial evidence to suggest that military expenditure has so 
far been used as a tool of economic policy. Dependency on 
imported weapons systems will not be substantially reduced by 
domestic arms production. It will merely be replaced by another 
form of dependency. Neither will domestic arms production 
generate appreciable backward and forward linkages which could 
pull the country out of the present economic crisis. The 
peculiarities of Greek development have created long term 
dependency on imported technology and capital goods which will 
not be reduced by arms production. Foreign military transfers 
have been instrumental in forging these dependency links and 
keeping the country open to foreign capital to operate under 
free and unregulated conditions. The links between military 
expenditure and economic growth are first established at the 
theoretical level. They are then estimated in the context of a 
growth model both directly and indirectly through the effect on 
savings and investment. The growth rate is treated as a function 
of both exogenous and endogenous variables and the impact of 
defence spending is estimated by two stage least squares in a 
series of equations. The results indicate that military 
expenditure has adversely affected growth in the period 1953-84 
mainly through the crowding out of investment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship 
between defence expenditure and the growth performance of the 
Greek economy in the period 1952 to 1987.
There are three main reasons for choosing the year 1952 as 
the starting point of the study. Firstly, data on military 
expenditure and information on other related variables are not 
readily available before the early 1950s. Secondly, Greece became 
a member of NATO in that particular year. Starting our 
examination from 1952 the study concentrates on the period during 
which Greece was a full member of the Western Military Alliance 
and is reasonable to expect this to have had a bearing on the 
levels and structure of Greek military expenditure. Finally, with 
the Greek Civil War having ended in the late 1940s, the early 
1950s signaled the start of a qualitative different socioeconomic 
and political development process of the country.
There are several good reasons for singling out Greece for 
such a study. Firstly, Greek military spending has been 
substantial during this period. Greece, a member of NATO, has 
regularly allocated a larger proportion of gross domestic product 
to defence than any other member of the Alliance. On average this 
was between five to six percent of GDP, and this, despite the
fact that Greece has one of the lowest per capita incomes in 
NATO. Greek military spending increased threefold between 1953 
and 1973 and since 1974 it has doubled as a result of the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus and the ongoing hostile relationships between 
the two countries, both members of NATO. It is reasonable to 
assume that the high levels of military spending have used up 
scarce resources that could have otherwise been used for other 
purposes such as education, health and social welfare or indeed 
investment in more productive activities. In spite of the sheer 
volume of resources allocated by Greece to defence the matter has 
received little attention in previous studies on Greek 
development.
Secondly, the growth performance of the Greek economy in terms 
of GNP/GDP has been quite impressive up to the mid-seventies. 
Since then the country has entered a deep economic crisis from 
which she still has to recover. It is possible that high levels 
of military expenditure may have contributed to continuous 
balance of payments problems and to a deteriorating external debt 
situation, and have generally retarded growth.
Thirdly, the military have, up to 1974, played an important 
role in the development of the country. During much of this 
period not only were they the main guardians of the status quo 
established after the conservative victory in the Civil War, but 
they have actually taken over the government for seven years from 
1967 to 1974.
Fourthly, in the light of the improving international climate 
and the efforts to limit the enormous stockpiles of both nuclear 
and conventional arms accumulated over many years, the issue of
the cost of armaments is once again raised. This is of particular 
interest in the case of Greece given her high levels of military 
expenditure.
Finally, given the strategic importance of Greece within NATO 
as an important strategic link with Turkey and her proximity to 
strategically sensitive areas such as the Middle East, the wider 
implications of her military capacity need to be considered. The 
strategic importance of Greece is manifested in the presence of 
important US military facilities and installations on her 
territory and the fact that the Aegean Sea is for NATO military 
planners an advantageous terrain for defence against a southward 
push of Warsaw Pact forces in a generalised conflict. Thus, what 
goes on in Greece is of particular interest to the West. This was 
highlighted in the past with the Truman Doctrine.
Several studies have been made on the impact of military 
spending on the performance of economies with contradictory 
results. The results of most studies so far seem to indicate a 
net negative impact of defence spending on the economy but on 
the other hand some studies have reached results that appear to 
show a positive impact on growth. Most studies on the issue are 
generally concerned with groups of countries rather than 
individual cases. However, due to the large heterogeneity of 
military expenditure and its different components as well as 
differences between countries, it is probably more appropriate 
to try to evaluate its impact in specific cases rather than 
groups of countries. This may help us gain a greater 
understanding of the issues involved, the channels through which 
growth may be affected, and thus reach more concrete results. The
task, however, is not particularly easy since defence spending 
is only but one variable in a complex economic situation and its 
impact may vary with the general state of the economy, the way 
that such spending is financed, whether arms procurement is from 
internal or external sources, and other policies of the 
government. Furthermore, military expenditure includes numerous 
elements, each of which may potentially have a different impact 
on the economy.
The present study will attempt to evaluate the impact of 
defence expenditure on the growth performance of the Greek 
economy during the post-war period. However, we believe that no 
economic problem can be understood in isolation from its social, 
political, international and even cultural aspects. This is 
particularly true in the case of Greece. For example it is not 
possible to address the question of the growth of military 
spending without examining the internal security aspect of the 
role of the Greek armed forces which by itself raises issues 
concerning the nature and role of the state and state 
apparatuses. Similarly, the interests of the military as a 
distinct social group also need to be addressed. Finally, 
international factors such as relations with Turkey and 
membership of NATO have to be examined. Current relations with 
Turkey cannot however be isolated from the historical context 
of their development and years of suspicions and hostile feelings 
between the two countries. The study, therefore, of the impact 
of military expenditure on the growth performance of the Greek 
economy in the post-war period, is possible only in the context 
of such sociopolitical factors operating in Greek society and of
wider international conditions.
Thus, the present study begins with an outline of the growth 
and development of the Greek economy in the post-war period which 
is given in chapter two. The discussion of the post-war 
development of Greece is not concentrated only on economic 
aspects but also draws attention to important political and, to 
a lesser extent, social aspects of this development. The 
considerable economic growth of the country up to the mid-70s and 
the subsequent economic crisis since then are discussed. At the 
same time, attention is drawn not only to the levels of military 
expenditure during this period, but also to the role of the Greek 
military and to the economic, political and military dependency 
ties with the West. This discussion in chapter two is intended 
to help our understanding of the background issues in the 
subsequent analyses of a) the factors influencing Greek military 
expenditure; b) the impact of external military relations with 
particular reference to the role of arms transfers; c) the 
effects of the establishment of an arms industry and whether 
this can stimulate economic growth through backward and forward 
linkages given the capital and human endowments of the Greek 
economy and d) the impact that military expenditure may have had 
on the economy's performance given her specific characteristics. 
The chapter ends with a discussion on wider aspects and issues 
concerning development and with a general evaluation of Greek 
development drawing attention to certain limitations of this 
particular model of development.
Chapter three looks at the sources of military data and draws 
attention to issues concerning their reliability and accuracy.
It then proceeds to look at world levels of military expenditure 
and briefly discusses aspects of this as well as recent 
developments. It ends with a detailed look at Greek military 
expenditure and other related data, drawing together the 
information and data on Greek defence spending from the previous 
chapter. It is also shown that, when compared with other 
countries and in particular other NATO members, Greece has 
regularly allocated more resources to defence than any other 
member.
Having looked at world and Greek levels of military 
expenditures, we then turn to see how the subject has been 
addressed in economic theory. Chapter four offers a summary of 
the relevant economic literature concerning defence spending and 
militarism. We look at the contributions on the subject by a 
number of writers and at how the question of military expenditure 
is addressed by the main schools of thought.
In chapter five the factors that influence and determine 
military spending are examined and their applicability in the 
case of Greece is evaluated and tested. This is done using 
regression analysis where possible. It is shown that military 
expenditure in Greece has been influenced by a combination of 
both internal and external factors; and that the relative 
importance of the various factors has changed over the years in 
line with domestic and external developments.
Chapter six looks at the efforts of the past few years to 
establish and develop an arms industry in Greece. The main 
industries within this sector are surveyed offering the necessary 
background information for a more general evaluation of the
impact of the defence sector on the Greek economy. Drawing on the 
experience of other similar cases the likely economic, political 
and military consequences are then considered. It is attempted 
to establish by means of regression analysis whether arms 
production as a form of import substitution has so far had any 
impact on the rest of the economy through backward and forward 
linkages with other sectors and the generation of inter- 
industrial demand. The belief that this sector can act as leading 
sector in the economy is questioned.
In chapter seven we address the role of military transfers 
with particular reference to US and other Western military aid 
to Greece during the post-war period. It is argued that such 
assistance need to be looked at not only in terms of political, 
military and strategic considerations but also in terms of 
economic factors, namely the aim to keep the country open for 
capitalist penetration. Thus the relationship between military 
assistance and foreign investment is examined and its impact on 
the development of the economy discussed. This is based on the 
discussion in chapter two concerning the role of foreign capital 
in the development process of Greece and the structure of the 
economy.
Chapter eight reviews the literature on the relationship 
between military expenditure and economic growth and looks at 
the empirical results of other studies on the subject. It then 
proceeds to estimate the effect that military spending may have 
had on growth in the case of Greece for the post-war period. This 
is done using both ordinary least squares and two stage least 
squares in the context of a growth model.
Finally, in chapter nine we draw together the findings of our 
study. Concluding comments are made on the aspects of military 
expenditure and how defence spending has affected the growth 
performance of the Greek economy in the post-war period. On the 
basis of the results of our study and the current situation we 
argue that in the near future at least Greece will continue to 
allocate substantial resources to defence which will probably 
have a high opportunity cost and retard growth.
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CHAPTER 2
THE POST WAR DEVELOPMENT OF GREECE
2.1 Introduction
Greece in economic and political terms belongs to the Western 
world and it is a part of the European capitalist periphery. She 
is a member of both EEC and NATO having joined them in 1981 and 
1952 respectively. Broadly speaking most studies of Greece (Dovas 
1980, Negreponti-Delivani 1985, Babanasis & Soulas 1976, Samaras 
1982 and others) describe her as being a capitalist country with 
a middle level of development. Many writers, such as Fotopoulos 
(1975,1985), also stress what they consider to be one of most 
important characteristics of modern Greece; that is her high 
degree of dependency on advanced capitalist countries in 
economic, political and military terms. A further important 
characteristic of the country, little emphasised if at all in 
most studies, is the fact that throughout the post-war period 
she has allocated on average more than 5% of GDP to defence, 
often the highest in NATO. This has increased further in the 
last fifteen years to about 6.5% of GDP on average. She also has 
the highest ratio among NATO members of armed forces per thousand 
inhabitants or as a percentage of the economically active 
population and often, more than a quarter of all government
expenditure is for military purposes.
The modern Greek state has a history of 165 years since the 
National Revolution of 1821 when Greece gained liberation from 
the Ottoman empire after 400 years of Turkish occupation. At the 
time, the newly born Greek state occupied only about 47,5 
thousand square kilometers and had a population of about 753 
thousand, according to 1828 data (Dovas 1980).
Today, Greece covers an area of 132 thousand square kilometers 
and has a population of about 10 million. Perhaps indicative of 
the peculiarities of the country's socioeconomic development is 
the fact that almost half as many Greeks live abroad due to high 
levels of emigration. Furthermore, one third of her population 
is currently concentrated in the Athens-Piraeus region which also 
offers almost 46% of industrial employment and produces more than 
half of the country's GDP.
This section is a critical survey of the post-war development 
of Greece aiming to provide the necessary background information 
that will help our understanding of the main theme of this study. 
Where necessary, reference may be made to pre-war events from 
which post war characteristics may have been inherited. At the 
same time, throughout this economic and sociopolitical survey, 
attention will be drawn to the levels of military spending and 
other related data, as well as factors that may have influenced 
defence spending.
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2.2 The Effects of War and Occupation
The Second World War and the years of Occupation were a 
tremendous blow for Greece. About 5.5% of the total population 
perished, national income fell vertically, and the economy was 
left in ruins. This however was not the most important impact 
of the War and Occupation. The state of the Greek economy at the 
end of the War was not much different of that of other 
participants.
The most important impact of those years is to be found in 
the changes that occurred in the Greek political scene. These 
were fundamental changes with long term effects. During the years 
of Occupation, the Greek government and the two major bourgeois 
parties, which were organised on clientelistic lines and 
dominated for a long period the political scene, were totally 
disorganised. The King, the government and most major bourgeois 
politicians fled to Egypt during the occupation years. The Left 
and mainly the Communist Party (KKE) managed to mobilise the 
urban and rural population and build a big and strong resistance 
movement, the National Liberation Front (EAM). By the time the 
occupation forces withdrew most of the Greek territory was under 
the direct control of KKE and EAM and they were the single 
biggest political force at the time, with a very strong military 
wing ELAS. In the years that followed, 1945-49, while most 
countries were engaged in the reconstruction of their economies, 
Greece was torn apart by civil war. The Civil War ended with the 
total victory of the right wing forces and the royalists that 
returned from Egypt.
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This victory, was to a large extent due to the massive 
assistance provided by Britain and the US to the right wing 
forces. This period, was also marked by beginning of a new era 
of dependency for Greece. As a result of the changes in the 
international scene and the emergence of the US as the undisputed
leader of the capitalist world, Greece, with the declaration of
2 
the Truman Doctrine, passed under the US sphere of influence.
Foreign dependence of course, was nothing new. Greece had 
already a long history of foreign influence, dependence and 
intervention. This can be directly traced back to the early days 
of national independence. Morton (1938) writes that "the revolt 
of the Greeks against Turkish rule opened the Eastern Question 
that runs so tortuously through the history of the 19th century. 
Here Austria and Russia were on opposite sides and Canning (the 
British Foreign Secretary) saw in intervention in Greece a method 
of splitting the Holly Alliance . . . both Britain and France were 
careful that the new Greek state should not be under Russian 
control" (p.385). Thus, "emerging from its struggle for 
independence ... Greece found itself strapped into a dependency 
role in foreign affairs. The Great Powers considered the Greek 
inhabited area of the Balkans a valuable piece of real estate" 
(Papacosma, 1985, p.189). As a result, the three Great Powers - 
France, Britain and Russia - became the guarantors of the newly 
born Greek state in order to secure their interests in the area. 
As Svoronos (1986) observes, the extent of their influence is 
reflected in the names of the three main Greek political parties 
of the period: the French Party, the English Party and the 
Russian Party. Each one of them represented the interests of each
12
power in the region. The ties of dependency, evident throughout 
the history of the modern Greek state, were in a sense 
institutionalised and sewn-in in Greek politics right from the 
early days of her existence. The declaration of the Truman 
Doctrine in March 1947 simply signified a change of dependence 
in line with the new international conditions; it marked the 
beginning of a shift of the centre of gravity from the old 
Imperial Powers of Europe to the US which emerged as the most 
powerful capitalist country and the new centre of imperialism 
after World War II. The immediate purpose of the Truman Doctrine, 
was to ensure that, countries which were previously under British 
influence would come under US influence after British withdrawal, 
and thus remain within the Western sphere of dominance. 
One of the first implications of the Truman Doctrine was the 
direct US involvement in Greece as well as her neighbour Turkey. 
In effect it "proclaimed an American protectorate over Greece and 
Turkey" (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, p.188).
The reasons for an active US involvement in both countries 
became clearer when Truman "abandoning his moral abstractions" 
expressed the strategic factors involved: "It is necessary only 
to glance at a map to realise that the survival and integrity of 
the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider 
situation. If Greece should fall under the control of the 
Communists, the effect upon its neighbour, Turkey, would be 
immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread 
throughout the entire Middle East" (Hartmann, 1983, p.394).
The Truman Doctrine and its impact on Greece will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter seven as will the levels of US and
13
other western assistance, mostly military, to Greece during the 
immediate post-war years. It will be shown that this assistance 
played a crucial role in keeping the country afloat. But a more 
important result was the fact that, due to the massive amounts 
of external military aid, it became possible to defeat the left 
in the Civil War and to establish a pro-western system of 
government in the country. Indeed, it will be argued that an 
important reason for this assistance was to secure the country's 
western orientation not only for military and strategic reasons 
but also for economic reasons as well.
After the end of the Civil War, with the defeat of the Left, 
a quasi-parliamentary regime was established in the country with 
the help of the Americans: a regime of guided or limited 
democracy which outlawed the Communist Party and through a 
variety of legal and illegal mechanisms, systematically 
persecuted not only the defeated Left, but also liberal and anti- 
royalist forces. The army, the major victor of the Civil War, 
emerged as a strong, probably the strongest, force in the throne 
- parliamentary force - army triarchy which dominated Greek 
politics for more than twenty five years, and played an important 
role in the maintenance of the status-quo in the country. 
Differences among these three forces existed, but were kept to 
a minimum until the early 60s. From 1952-63 an uninterrupted rule 
of the right wing parliamentary force took place.
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2.3 Guided Democracy
The economic model of development followed during this period 
was the one proposed by the right wing victors of the Civil War. 
The political struggle during the Civil War in the late 40s was 
also reflected in the alternative economic strategies for 
development proposed by the two major political forces in Greece 
at the time: the left and the right. Broadly speaking one can 
identify two main approaches and strategies towards the question 
of development of the country.
The first model proposed by the right, was a typical model 
of an open economy integrated in the world capitalist system. 
The sectors that were to be targeted for development were the 
ones that thought to had a comparative advantage. Since Greece 
at the time was predominantly agricultural it was argued that 
the comparative advantages of the primary sector should be 
utilised.
The second model on the other hand, had a completely different 
approach to the problem of development. It proposed a rather 
closed economy, at least in the early stages, giving emphasis to 
the nationalisation of important branches, the development of 
heavy industry and to the diversification of the trade partners
Q(Batsis 1947) . One could say that this model was typical of left 
wing economic thinking at the time. It reflected the dominant 
belief of the left that the growth of heavy industry was of vital 
importance to the overall economic development performance of a
country.
The result of the Civil War meant the rigid implementation
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of the first model. During this period, i.e 1950-63, the economy 
grew at relatively high rates, and there were also qualitative 
changes in the structure of the economy. The average annual rate 
of growth of the GNP was 6.6%, and by 1963 the secondary sector 
accounted for more than a quarter of GNP, while the share of the 
primary sector declined.
Throughout this period the right wing enjoyed uninterrupted 
political rule. The parliamentary block of the ruling party 
during this period held certain characteristics derived from the 
particular historical conditions that it emerged from. First, it 
was its mistrust of parliamentary democracy itself manifested in 
the extensive use of para-state and other illegal mechanisms. 
Secondly, in its attempt to gain some degree of popular support, 
it utilised clientelistic networks (already in existence) in all 
aspects of the socioeconomic life. The so-called "rousfeti" 
dominated all aspects of every day life. This of course had a 
negative impact on the function of the state apparatus. 
Inefficiency and corruption were widespread. The third and most 
important characteristic was the lack of the most basic "national 
elements" in its policies. Apart from the internal historical 
reasons for this, the main reason is that it came to power as a 
result of the US involvement and its main task was the 
legitimisation of the political and economic dependence.
During this period the state controlled the financial sector 
and its involvement in all the sectors of the economy was 
essential in providing the necessary infrastructure and back up 
to private capital in its ventures. The state budget regularly 
accounted for a substantial portion of the GDP. A substantial
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part of this state expenditure was military spending which 
regularly accounted for more than a quarter, and at times, one 
third of all government expenditure and about 5% of GDP (Table 
2.1). This was mainly due to the rebuilding and reorganising of 
the armed forces that took place in this period. This however, 
can not be seen in isolation of the country's membership of NATO 
and the role of the army in propping up internal security. Both 
of the above will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent 
section. For the time being it should be noted that membership 
of NATO meant new commitments for the Greek armed forces and the 
successful control of popular pressures from below also required
an increased role for the army in internal security
matters. However, at the same time, the first signs of external
security concerns as regards relations with Turkey are also 
evident. As it can be seen in table 2.1, in 1956 there is a 
sudden increase in defence spending. This is probably a reaction 
to the sudden deterioration in the relations between the two 
countries as a result of the emergence of the Cyprus issue and 
the pogroms against the Greek minorities in Constantinople and 
Izmir in September 1955.
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Table 2.1
Government Expenditure (GEX) as % of GDP, 
ME as % of GEX and as % of GDP 1950-63
rear
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
GEX as %
of GDP
19.96
18.23
17.41
20.14
20.26
19.52
18.94
18.66
18.46
19.55
19.81
20.30
21.75
20.56
ME*
(mil $)
115
137
132
126
135
138
178
157
155
161
170
165
168
172
ME as %
Of GEX
__
 
28.1
27.5
29.5
29.4
32.6
29.6
27.9
26.4
25.4
23.1
20.9
20.8
ME as %
of GDP
6.0
5.6
5.3
5.2
5.5
5.2
6.0
5.1
4.8
4.9
4.9
4.3
4.1
3.9
*constant 1960 Sources: The Greek Economy Vol III 1984 
US dollars Bank of Greece, SIPRI Yearbooks,
Government Budgets
Nevertheless, in spite of all the shortcomings of the economic 
policies pursued by the state, the Greek economy grew with 
satisfactory rates. The standards of living also increased 
significantly during this period, especially from the early 60s. 
At the same time, however, income inequalities also increased 
enormously. The inequalities in income were much greater than 
those in the West due to the specific development process of 
Greece and the characteristics of the model of development that 
was followed by the ruling classes.
Furthermore, the development model and the specific political 
conditions of the country were incompatible with a massive 
involvement of the subordinate classes in politics because their 
"autonomous" participation in the political process would have
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resulted in the radical reduction of the income inequalities to 
say the least. An improvement in the inequalities, however, would 
have undermined the willingness of foreign and indigenous capital 
to invest. This was so because the specific development pattern 
followed, not only did it create such inequalities, but its 
success was in fact based on the existence of such inequalities. 
The army, as already mentioned, was one of the main agents 
through which these inequalities were maintained. Its role as an 
internal security force was important in ensuring limited workers 
unionisation and also hindered the participation of progressive 
and/or left wing organisations in the Greek political scene.
The state in order to maintain the status quo, had two 
alternative options: a) the political participation of the masses 
through vertical clientelistic political organisations controlled 
by the dominant classes or b) the imposition of dictatorial modes 
of control (Mouzelis, 1978). However, neither of the above 
options constitutes a permanent solution and in the case of 
Greece in the post-war period, despite the defeat of the Left 
which postponed any immediate and real threat to the status quo 
for a long time, the system was faced with a permanent 
instability. The objective of the state was that of 
"legitimising" the political non-participation status of the 
oppressive system during this period and, towards its end of the 
period, a lot depended on the ideological functions of the state 
which, however, proved to be very inadequate in attaining this 
objective.
The radicalisation of the students and growing labour 
militancy as early as the mid-50s were strong indications of the
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unsuccessful function of the ideological mechanisms of the state 
and the inability of the dominant classes to gain real support 
at grass roots level. Gradually the ruling classes started losing 
ground in both countryside and towns. A clear sign of this was 
the 1958 election gains of the left wing party EDA which was 
supported by the illegal Communist Party. By gaining 25% of the 
vote it became the main opposition in parliament.
This development immediately put the whole repressive 
apparatus on the alert. The army and the para-state mechanism 
was mobilised to safeguard a right wing victory in the 1961 
elections with a substantial degree of falsification of the 
results (Meyneaux, 1975). The repressive period of 1958-61 
weakened the Left and created the necessary political space for 
the regeneration of the Centre Party, up to then fragmented and 
weak as a result of the deep polarisation of the political scene 
between Right and Left. The Centre proclaimed numerous liberal 
reforms which captured the imagination of ordinary people. The 
reunification of the Centre under G. Papandreou (Centre Union 
Party) with the support of the Left effectively challenged the 
electoral dominance of the Right in the 1963 and 1964 elections 
to gain an unprecedented 53% majority in the latter.
2.4 Political Instability and Dictatorship
In the late 50s and especially the early 60s there was 
enormous pressure from the masses for political change. In the 
1963-65 period, the liberal government (the Centre Union Party 
under G. Papandreou) came to office after gaining an
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unprecedented 53% majority. Its liberalisation policies included 
the ending of the open political intimidation, minor checks on 
the growing economic inequalities, the establishment of a free 
educational system, the increase of state expenditure on welfare 
and a more independent foreign policy. There were also signs of 
a reorganisation of the state mechanism, improving its efficiency 
and the effectiveness of its policies.
The new government, however, never attempted to deliver an 
effective blow to the para-state or to challenge the power of 
the army; but its liberalisation policies were enough to alarm 
the army and the palace. The government was brought down after 
a small group of its MPs defected from the ruling party thus 
splitting the parliamentary majority and joined the successive 
governments formed by the throne in the 1965-67 period which 
created the necessary political instability which in turn paved 
the way for the military coup in April 1967. Different writers 
such as Mouzelis (1978, 1986), Poulantzas (1975), Katris (1974) 
have emphasised different factors, both internal and external, 
that led to the military takeover. This debate will be addressed 
later on when the role of the army is discussed in chapter five. 
Here we will only deal with the effects of the dictatorship on 
the economy and its economic strategy.
Overall, it can be said that the new regime accepted the 
existing model of development. The regime also followed most of 
the obligations of the country from the 1961 Association
o
Agreement despite the fact that the EEC postponed most of its 
obligations. The new regime not only accepted the existing model 
of development but it also attempted to remove all obstacles for
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its full implementation. Indeed, "after a short period of 
hesitation, and once the colonels' credentials were fully 
established, private investment rose again and foreign capital 
continued penetrating the economy. The rate of growth soon 
surpassed pre-dictatorial levels and sustained an impressive 
acceleration" (Mouzelis, 1978, p.129). Foreign capital was 
provided with such concessions that some of the more scandalous 
agreements had to be revised in the post-74 period. Wage 
determination became a "free market" issue since any strike 
activity was forbidden. Some attempts to "liberalise" the economy 
were made by reducing state involvement in the trade of 
agricultural products and generally in price control. The 
military government coincided with favourable international and 
national conditions for economic success and growth. The rates 
of growth of the economy were fairly impressive (Table 2.2) and, 
despite the unchanged and in fact increasing income inequalities, 
the standards of living grew steadily.
Table 2.2 
Annual Changes in GNP 1963-74 (%)
Year % Change Year % Change Year % Change
10.2
8.2
9.4
6.1
1967
1968
1969
1970
5.4
6.7
9.8
8.0
s
1971
1972
1973
1974
1963     7.1
1964     8.9
1965     7.3
1966     -3.6
Source: The Greek Economy, Bank of Greece, 
Vol III, (1984)
New consumption patterns emerged (e.g introduction of TV on 
a massive scale) as a result of economic and political factors. 
The regime attempted to use them as a substitute of the political
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support which was not only lacking when it came to power but was 
not even able to win after the seizure of power. Indeed as 
Karagiorgas (1974) points out that the dictatorship actively 
encouraged this consumption by following an "open door" policy 
for imported consumer goods. This, in his opinion, resulted in 
"the national external debt of the country to reach 2,583 million 
dollars in 1972 from $ 1,107 million in 1967" and this "created 
a false sense of prosperity" (ibid, p.25-27). As a result of the 
increased imports the balance of payments deficit tripled in the 
space of a year from $ 367 million in 1972 to $ 1,175 million in 
1973.
The changes that occurred in consumption may have had some 
effect on the duration of the dictatorship but could not lead 
to its permanent consolidation. The new economic and 
sociopolitical framework left unchanged the conditions that 
generated the political discontent in the early 60s. The world 
recession in 1973 which had an important effect in the Greek 
economy (Table 2.2 above) coincided with the internal political 
mobilisation an example of which are the 1972-73 student 
uprisings and the events of November 1973 in the Polytechnic of 
Athens? Political and economic factors had reached a point at 
which the downfall of the regime was eminent. The coup in Cyprus 
by the Greek regime and the subsequent invasion of the island by 
Turkey in 1974, had a catalytic effect on the dictatorship in 
Athens. The regime, just before its dismissal, turned to the 
politicians in order to preserve the army's position in the 
post-74 power structure.
However, the traditional triarchy structure (throne - army -
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parliament) had already become outdated. The throne, already
weakened as the result of the military takeover, was officially
expelled from Greek politics after the 1974 referendum. The army
also had a weaker position in the post-74 power structure and its
political importance gradually decreased. To a certain degree,
this can be attributed to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus which
was executed on pretexts offered to Turkey by the actions of the
Greek military dictatorship in the island; namely the coup
against Archbishop Makarios staged by Greek forces stationed in
the island and their local supporters. Furthermore, the apparent
inability of the Greek military to come to the aid of Cyprus, to
stop the invasion or to limit Turkish territorial gains,
significantly weakened their position in the political system.
One would have expected that a military government would make one
of its top priorities the strengthening of the armed forces, if
for no other reason but to keep fellow officers "happy" and thus
secure their continuous support. In fact, military expenditure
increased during the years of the dictatorship, as it can be
seen in table 2.3, and Greece, by 1970, had one of the highest
relative defence burdens in the world, as it can be seen in table
2.4.
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Table 2.3 
ME as percentage of GEX and GDP
Year
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
ME ($ mil)
(1970 prices)
211
219
237
257
331
387
438
474
501
534
533
510
ME as %
of GEX
20.8
18.8
19.2
19.0
21.8
21.6
22.8
23.8
23.5
21.5
20.6
24.5
ME as %
as GDP
3.9
3.7
3.6
3.7
4.5
4.8
4.9
4.9
4.9
4.7
4.2
4.2
Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks and Government 
Budgets (various years)
However, despite the increases in military expenditure during 
the years of the dictatorship, in 1974 the Greek Armed Forces 
apparently proved totally unprepared and inadequate when called 
upon to perform their primary role namely to defend against an 
external threat i.e to fight a war and thus to justify their 
raison d'etre. In fact, the Greek Armed Forces were apparently 
totally disorganised due to the mismanagement of their affairs 
by the ruling clique of officers, and their almost exclusive 
orientation towards internal repression rather than external 
security as we will see in chapter five.
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Table 2.4 
Relative Burden of Military Expenditures, 1970
Q. 
Z 
 J
0
t/5
oJ
D 
Z
UJ
a.
X
Ul
I
OVER 
10%
5-10%
2-4.9%
1-1.9%
BELOW 
1%
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA
UNDER $100
. OS
Vietnam, North
Burma 
Somali Republic
Chad 
Ethiopia 
Guinea 
India 
Indonesia
Afghanistan 
Dahomey 
Haiti 
Niger 
Upper Volta
Malawi 
Nepal
$100-199
uambodia 
Vietnam, 
Republic of
China, People's 
Republic of 
Egypt 
Sudan
Central African 
Republic 
Mauritania 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Senegal 
Thailand 
Yemen 
Zaire
Cameroon 
Kenya 
Malagasy 
Republic 
Mali 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda
Ceylon 
Sierra Leone
$200-299
Iraq
Jordan 
Syrian Arab 
Republic
Congo (Brazza- 
ville) 
Ghana 
Korea, 
Republic of 
Morocco 
Turkey
Bolivia 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Rhodesia. 
Southern 
Tunisia
Liberia
$300-499
Albania 
Korea. North
China (Taiwan) 
Iran 
Malaysia
Algeria 
Brazil 
Dominican 
Republic 
Peru
Colombia 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Ivory Coast 
Nicaragua 
Zambia
$500-999
Saudi Arabia
Cuba 
Portugal
Argentina 
Chile 
Lebanon 
Mongolia 
South Africa, 
Republic of 
Spain 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yugoslavia
Cyprus 
Gabon 
Trinidad 
t Tobago
Costa Rica 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Panama
$1,000-1,999
Israel
Germany, East
fettfc Poland
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
Italy 
New Zealand 
Romania
Austria 
Libya
Ireland 
Japan
$2.000-2.999
Czechoslovakia 
Soviet Union 
United Kingdom
Australia 
Belgium 
France 
Netherlands 
Norway
Finland
Iceland
OVER $3.000
United States
Canada 
Denmark 
Germany, West 
Kuwait 
Sweden 
Switzerland
Luxembourg
Source: ACDA Yearbook, (1976)
Under the weight of the Cyprus tragedy the dictatorship 
collapsed, and the country returned to parliamentary rule. Above 
all, however, it was historical conditions that necessitated the 
strengthening of the parliamentary forces and the decline of the 
political importance of the military. The old repressive 
structures of government were no longer applicable in a fast 
changing world and had become outdated.
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2.5 Prolonged Economic Crisis
After the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974, Greece 
returned to parliamentary democracy. This return was associated 
with significant political changes. The traditional political 
structure, dominated by the triarchy of palace-army-parliamentary 
forces which had emerged in the early post-Civil War period was 
outdated and was replaced. The 1974 referendum put an end to the 
presence of the palace in Greek politics by a 70% majority in 
favour of Presidential Democracy. The position of the army, 
despite its attempt to remain a major force in the power 
structure, was significantly weakened and its importance in Greek 
politics gradually decreased. Even the traditional parliamentary 
forces had become outdated. The traditional two-party structure 
(the conservatives and the liberal centre) that dominated the 
inter-war period and the 60s was replaced by a new spectrum of 
political forces. The conservative forces were expressed by a 
new party, the New Democracy Party, the founder of which 
(Karamanlis) hoped it would modernise Greek politics along 
Western European lines. However, in practice failed to introduce 
both in the party and in the government administration (from 1974 
to 1981 when it was in power) the necessary modernisations that 
characterise similar conservative parties in Western Europe. The 
party remained organised in a non-democratic way. The 
clientelistic networks remained a dominant form of its 
relationship with the voters. The government administration and 
the function of the state mechanism were still characterised by 
traditional forms i.e. rousfeti, corruption etc but not to the
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same degree as before.
The economic changes of the post-1960 period brought about 
significant social changes. A new social stratification emerged 
in which the urban working class and the intellectuals became 
stronger social groups. A new middle strata emerged from the more 
complex economic structure. The new social stratification had at 
the same time an urban base and these changes weakened the 
ability of the clientelistic networks to constitute an effective 
way of political control and favoured the development of 
political forces organised on horizontal lines. Social conflicts 
and tensions suppressed for many years, along with the new ones 
that emerged from the socio-economic changes demanded the 
transformation of traditional political structures. The failure 
of the right wing to adjust to these changes was expressed in the 
declining trend in its electoral voting support in the subsequent 
elections: from 54% in 1974 to 42% in 1977 and 37% in 1981. The 
other traditional political force, the liberal party of the 
centre, had an even faster decline from 25% in 1974 to 13% in 
1977 and 3% in 1981, also due to the absence of a charismatic 
leader who could possibly unite the fragmented forces of the 
centre. The new socialist party (PASOK) captured the demands of 
the old and new middle strata and effectively used the 
dissatisfaction of other social groups (mainly the peasants). 
From 12% in 1974 it doubled its support to 25% in 1977 and it 
doubled it again to 48% in 1981 when it came to power. The 
Communist Party and the traditional Left which was extremely 
weakened in the post-Civil War period and particularly in th 60s 
re-entered in the post-75 political scene (for the first time
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legally since the end of the Civil War) and strengthened its 
position as the third political force, although in a less 
impressive way.
During this period i.e. 1974-87, the Greek economy grew at 
lower rates than the previous period (Table 2.5). The growth 
rate of the country's economy was affected by the entering of 
the world economy into the recession period after 1973.
The lower rates of growth that the Greek economy experienced 
during this period can also be attributed (apart from the 
international recession) to the absolute decline of investments. 
In 1978 for example, total investments were lower than in 1972 
(Negreponti-Delivani, 1981) and this lack of investments 
persisted in the 1980s. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that 
the economy's moderate growth was not associated with any 
significant structural changes. The small quantitative growth was 
largely due to the additional growth of the main elements of the 
production system that emerged in the previous period, rather 
than to any serious restructuring of the system itself. Perhaps 
the most significant change was the increase in the employment 
share of larger units but this was not associated so far with any 
major restructuring process in favour of production on a larger 
scale.
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Table 2.5 
Annual changes in GDP 1973-88
Year % Change Year % Change Year % Change
1973 7.3 1978 6.7 1983 0.4
1974 -3.6 1979 3.7 1984 2.8
1975 6.1 1980 1.8 1985 3.4
1976 6.4 1981 -0.3 1986 1.3
1977 3.4 1982 -0.2 1987 -0.7
1988 3.5
Source: The Greek Economy, Bank of Greece 
Vol III, (1984) and Reports of the 
Governor (1987, 1989)
The only significant change in the industrial base of the 
economy was the efforts to establish and develope an arms 
industry. This is probably the only important new sector to be 
created during this period. The reasons behind the efforts of 
successive governments to create domestic arms production 
capabilities were twofold: Firstly, the main objective was/is 
to decrease dependence on foreign sources for arms procurement 
and secondly, since strategic and military reasons dictated such 
a move, to try to gain some economic and technological benefits. 
These would be in the form of forward and backward linkages with 
other sectors of the economy thus generating interindustrial 
demand and hopefully spurring growth. Furthermore, indigenous 
production could mean foreign exchange savings and improvements 
in the balance of payments position and possibly in the future 
gains from exports. At the same time this sector could attract 
advanced technology and know how which could then spill over to 
other more backward sectors of the economy. In short, the defence 
sector could become a leading sector pulling the rest of the
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economy with it. The motives of this move and whether this 
venture has so far been successful or not and to what degree will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter six.
During this period the Greek economy, due to its "openness", 
proved vulnerable to the conditions of the world economy. The 
inflationary pressures created by the energy crisis were 
reflected in the inflation rates of this period (Table 2.6). 
However, besides the external factors, the internal ones are also 
important in explaining the high 
inflation of the period.
Table 2.6 
Inflation rates 1971-88
Year % Rate Year % Rate Year % Rate
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
3.2
4.3
15.5
26.9
13.4
13.3
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
12.2
12.6
19.0
24.9
24.5
20.9
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
20.2
18.4
19.3
23.0
16.4
13.5
Source: Reports of the Governor of the 
Bank of Greece (various years)
Perhaps one reason for the high inflation was the demand for 
wage increases in order to compensate for the real loss during 
the latter years of the dictatorship (Negrepondi-Delivani, 1981) . 
High wage increases after the 1981 victory of the socialist party 
contributed to the inflation rates of the 80s. Similarly the lack 
of any comprehensive planning ability on the behalf of the Greek 
governments and the ineffectiveness of their anti-inflationary 
policies may be cited as important contributing factors. The
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result was that Greece experienced higher than average rates of 
inflation than most OECD countries.
One can also point to a very important contributing factor 
to the high inflation rates was the high levels of military 
expenditure during this period as a result of the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the conflict with Turkey over the 
Aegean Sea. Military expenditure in Greece during 1975-84 was on 
average 6.6% of GDP (higher than any other NATO country). Table
2.7 shows military spending during this period as a percentage 
of both government expenditure and as a share of GDP, and table
2.8 shows that Greece continued to be one of the world's high 
military spenders. In table 2.7, noticeable is the sudden 
increase of defence spending in 1975 the year following the 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Similarly, the increasing debt of 
central government during this period, shown in table 2.9 as a 
percentage of GNP, could also be attributed to the high levels 
of military spending.
Table 2.7 
ME as % of GEX and GDP
rear ME ($ mil) ME as % 
(1973 prices) of GEX
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
650
1043
1197
1447
1230
1262
1093
1294
1318
1202
1428
1417
1320
24.5
26.6
24.7
25.8
25.3
24.0
22.9
21.6
21.1
18.6
18.3
16.3
17.1
ME as % 
of GDP
4.2
6.8
6.9
7.0
6.7
6.3
5.7
7.0
6.9
6.3
7.2
7.1
6.9
Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks and Government Budgets
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Central Government Debt as % of GNP 1975-84
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Total Foreign Internal 
Debt Debt Debt 
( all as percentage of GNP )
19.6
21.8
21.4
21.7
28.6
26.8
26.8
31.8
35.2
40.8
49.4
5.5
7.4
6.1
4.9
5.1
5.3
6.2
7.7
8.9
12.4
16.3
14.1
14.3
15.4
16.7
23.5
21.4
20.5
24.1
26.3
28.3
33.1
Source: The Greek Economy in Figures,
Vol III, Bank of Greece, (1986)
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Many have argued that most of the problems that the country's 
economy currently faces need serious long term planning and 
measures. Measures that take into consideration the rapid changes 
in the international economy as well as the long term 
implications of the country's membership of the European 
Community as the pace towards European integration accelerates. 
They have called for an evaluation and rethinking of the 
country's position in the international division of labour. No 
consensus however exists on the future development road that the 
country should follow (see for example: Dracatos, 1988; 
Aggelopoulos, 1981 and 1986; Vamvoukas, 1989). The various 
proposals depend a lot on the writer's assessment of the post- 
war development path that Greece has followed and on his/her 
political stance. To the debate on the country's development we 
now turn. 
2.6 The Concept of Development
Since the collapse of the dictatorship and the return to full 
parliamentary democracy a debate has ensued on the nature of the 
post-war development of Greece.
The debate concerning the development of Greece is not an 
isolated example of disagreement between writers on the subject, 
but rather it is part of the wider debate on the issue of 
development and of what it actually comprises.
Perhaps the conventional definition is the one that views 
development as "a multidimensional process or set of objectives, 
in which the dimensions are economic, social, political and 
cultural in the widest sense of these terms" (Colman & Nixson
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1978, p.4) . At the same time they also point out that development 
in this sense is not synonymous with economic growth and it is 
possible to envisage development with negative growth as it is 
also possible to have economic growth with negative development. 
Dowd (1967) notes that "growth is a quantitative process 
principally involving the extension of an already established 
structure, whereas development suggests qualitative changes, the 
creation of new economic and non-economic structures" (p.153). 
Similarly, Todaro (1981) perceives development "as a 
multidimensional process involving the reorganisation and 
reorientation of entire economic and social systems. In addition 
to improvements in incomes and output, it typically involves 
radical changes in institutional, social and administrative 
structures as well as in popular attitudes and, in many cases, 
even customs and beliefs" (p.56).
On the basis of the aforementioned definitions it is evident 
that development can be judged or measured on the basis of 
qualitative criteria. However, most of the measurement indicators 
used are quantitative ones. Attempting therefore to measure it, 
is particularly difficult since no quantitative indicator is 
capable of exactly measuring a qualitative criterion. It could 
be said therefore that, to a large extent, the rate and, in our 
case, the relative level of development are normative concepts 
whose definition and measurement may well depend upon the value 
judgments of the analysts involved. Perhaps this explains to a 
certain degree the disagreements that exist between the various 
writers on the subject.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that countries
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have diverse structures and different characteristics and it is 
difficult to make absolute generalisations. As Baran (1957) 
points out "just as the advanced sector includes a multitude of 
areas as far apart in economic, social, political and cultural 
characteristics as the US and Japan, Germany and France. . . so the 
underdeveloped sector is composed of a wide variety of countries 
with tremendous differences between them" (p.265). With regard 
to this diversity of the various countries Todaro (1981, p.24) 
lists seven major areas of possible diversity:
1) The size of the country (geographic, population, income)
2) Historical evolution
3) Physical and human resource endowments
4) The relative importance of the public and private sectors
5) The nature of the industrial structure
6) The degree of dependence on external economic and 
political forces
7) The distribution of power and the institutional and 
political structure within the nation.
At the same time of course, those countries also share a 
number of common characteristics such as relative low standards 
of living, low productivity and a degree of dependence to 
advanced countries; and "in attempting to comprehend the laws of 
motion of both the advanced and the backward parts of the 
capitalist world, it is possible, and indeed mandatory, to 
abstract from the peculiarities of the individual cases and to 
concentrate on their essential common characteristics" (Baran 
1957, p.265). On the other hand though, when it comes to 
examining specific cases it is essential for the analysis not to
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try to classify countries by all costs to one of the generalised 
groups but rather, it should try to approach the specific case 
allowing for and incorporating its peculiarities. It is on the 
basis of the above that we now turn to discuss on a more general 
level the post-war development of Greece and to attempt an 
overall evaluation of the Greek development process.
2.7 The Debate on Greek Development
On the face of it, the economic development of Greece, which 
was achieved without any form of comprehensive planning, can be 
said to have been satisfactory. If one relies purely on the 
various indices of economic growth s/he can come to the 
conclusion that Greece, practically undeveloped and devastated 
by the long years of the Second World War and the menace of the 
Civil War that followed, had reached by the late seventies, 
before the current economic crisis, a fairly satisfactory level 
of development. If one looks at GNP growth rates it can be seen 
that in the period 1951-86 it averaged 5.35% per year. Per capita 
GDP also rose from 9,843 Dr in 1950 to 46,028 Dr in 1986 
(constant prices). The numbers seem to tell a fairly successful 
story. However, to pass judgement only on the basis of the 
various growth indicators it will probably lead to wrong 
conclusions.
To seek a more correct picture one needs to look underneath 
the surface of things. It is then that a fuller picture emerges 
on the basis of which one can attempt to draw a sketch of the 
Greek development model. This though is easier said than done.
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As Delivani-Negreponti (1985) points out there are many 
difficulties in attempting to trace the fundamental directives 
of the development model of the Greek economy. This is mainly due 
to the fact that, on the whole, the economic policies of 
successive governments were aimed to provide short term solutions 
to current economic problems. There was a distinct lack of any 
long term planning for development with concrete goals and 
targets for the direction of the Greek economy. It is probably 
no exaggeration to say that the development of the Greek economy 
was left to a large extent to the factor chance. This said 
however, one can identify certain characteristics, and by 
observing the curious mosaic of measures and, most important, 
their results, it is possible to attempt to sketch a model of the 
development direction of the country in the postwar period.
Needless to say, however, that there is no consensus among 
the writers on the subject of the development of Greece. On a 
broad basis one can identify two main trends of approach to the 
issue.
In the first instance there are those who by using a number 
of economic indices such as per capita GDP, the contribution of 
industry to GDP, the share of industrial products in total 
exports etc (Table 2.10) attempt to derive the general level of 
development of Greece . On the basis of their examination of such 
economic indicators they conclude "that as a result of the post- 
war development, Greece was transformed from an undeveloped 
country to one with a middle level of development in the 
periphery of the developed capitalist countries, with the 
tendency to evolve to a developed one" (Babanasis and Soulas,
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1976, p.23). Similarly "Greece in the last fifteen years evolved 
from an agricultural country to an agricultural-industrial one 
and she has entered the take-off stage" (Zachareas, 1972, p.18). 
Broadly similar conclusions have been reached by other writers 
such as Nicolinacos (1977), Dovas (1980), Avdelidis (1975) and 
Samaras (1982). The latter also points out that Greece is at the 
bottom of the European league of development just above Portugal 
in terms of its level of development and this despite the 
satisfactory post-war rates of growth.
On the other hand there are those writers who approach the 
issue from the angle of a historical analysis of the Greek 
development process emphasising the peculiarities of Greek 
capitalism in relation to the metropolis-satellite distinction.
It is thus pointed out that from looking at the position 
Greece occupies in the international division of labour she could 
possibly be classified as a less developed peripheral economy. 
But from the angle of the degree of national economic integration 
she is more comparable to the western economies of the core 
(Vergopoulos, 1975). Similarly Poulantzas (1976) argues that in 
the case of countries such as Greece (he also refers to Spain and 
Portugal) it "would be wrong to foist on these countries the 
traditional notion of underdevelopment. By their economic and 
social structure, they are now part of Europe ... we can even say 
that certain features of the new dependence that they present to 
the US and to the other European countries (the EEC) also 
characterise those European countries that themselves form part 
of the imperialist metropolises..." (p.10).
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Table 2.10 
Changes in major economic indices 1950-80
1950 1960 1970
Change 
1980 1980/50
1) GDP Factor prices 74,355 129,201 258,000 
million dr. 
(constant 1970 pr)
2) Per Capita
National Income 
(current US $)
3) Per Capita
National Income 
(constant 1970 US $)
4) Imports as % of GDP 
(current prices)
5) Exports as % of GDP 
(current prices)
6) Exports as % 
of Imports
7) Primary Sector's 
Share of GDP
143 429 1,154
417,200 +5.6 
times
4,377 +30.6 
times
351 582 1,154 1,692
21.3 18.8 21.3 31.1
5.2 10.3 11.6 21.7
24.4 54.7 54.6 69.7
27.9 23.4 18.3 14.5
8) Secondary Sector's 20.1 26.0 
Share of GDP
31.6 32.3
9) Tertiary Sector's 
Share of GDP
52.0 51.6 50.1 53.2
10) Relation between 1.39 0.90 
Primary & Secondary 
sectors ( 7/8)
0.58 0.45
+4.8 
times
+ 1.5 
times
+4.2 
times
+2.9 
times
-0.48 
times
+ 1.61 
times
+ 1.02 
times
-0.68 
times
Source: Kindis, (1982)
The important contribution by Mouzelis (1978) in understanding 
the development of modern Greece should also be mentioned here. 
He argues that the main characteristic of the country's 
underdevelopment is to be seen in the existence on the one hand, 
"of a technologically advanced, highly dynamic, foreign
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controlled manufacturing sector" which, on the other hand "is not 
organically linked with the rest of the economy so that the 
beneficial effects of its growth are not diffused over the small 
commodity agricultural and artisanal sectors but are transferred 
abroad". He points out that in the post-war period much, if not 
all, of the industrial development of the country was due to the 
"direct help from foreign capital which injected itself into the 
key sectors of Greek industry" (p.29). For him the major source 
of dynamism of the Greek socioeconomic formation was exogenous 
rather than endogenous. Fotopoulos (1985), however, points to 
certain problems which may undermine the usefulness of the 
approach. He questions the validity of characterising Greek 
agriculture as precapitalist and as being stagnant which appears 
to contradict the post-war growth rates of the sector despite the 
fact that agricultural population has been decreasing. He also 
disagrees with the assertion that the capitalist mode of 
production, in a strict marxian sense, is indeed the dominant 
mode of production in the Greek social formation.
When attempting to sketch the post war development of Greece 
the prevailing conditions in the country at the start of the 
period must be taken into consideration. The socioeconomic and 
political state of affairs that the country was in at the 
beginning of the period under consideration here is not important 
in our examination only in a quantitative way. That is in 
allowing us to quantify the progress achieved over the forty or 
so years. It is important for a more vital reason. In a way the 
socioeconomic and political situation at the time influenced and
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in a sense predetermined in a qualitative, as well as 
quantitative way, Greek development over the next three and a 
half decades. With the given set of circumstances, the 
development path followed and the results achieved can not, in 
retrospect, said to have been totally surprising or unexpected. 
Had a different set of circumstances prevailed then a 
quantitative and qualitative different development would have 
been achieved. In a way this is stating the obvious but it is 
very important to bare those circumstances in mind.
What were the prevailing socioeconomic and political 
circumstances in Greece at the beginning of the 50s? The already 
backward and undeveloped economy of the country was devastated 
after a decade of fighting. Most countries during the late 
forties were engaged in rebuilding and modernising their already 
existent industrial base. Greece on the other hand was torn apart 
by a bloody Civil War. At the time she had an almost non existent 
industrial structure and relative low physical and human resource 
endowments. Many of her brightest young people were either killed 
during the long years of fighting or persecuted if they were on 
the defeated side. The availability of investment capital from 
internal sources of finance was particularly low. Greek capital, 
in its best pre-war traditions, mostly chose to engage in 
commerce and construction activities rather than in the 
manufacturing sector. It was apparently unable or unwilling to 
orient itself towards the manufacturing sector and especially in 
key branches which usually can contribute most to a rapid growth 
of the industrial sector. In fact as the figures show in table 
2.11 below, investment in manufacturing throughout the period
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was comparatively low. The construction industry has been the 
sector that attracted most investment. This may help explain
Table 2.11 
Sectoral Distribution of Fixed Capital Formation
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Agriculture etc 11.2 7.9 17.4 12.3 10.6 10.5 6.6 9.1
Quarrying,
Mining 1.1 0.8 0.5 1.2 2.1 2.2 5.8 4.0
Manufacturing 22.7 12.2 9.9 14.3 14.2 17.6 16.1 14.2
Energy,
Water, Sewage 3.4 10.2 7.9 9.7 7.2 8.1 7.2 12.1
Transport,
Communications 17.1 9.2 18.8 17.1 20.8 18.8 20.9 22.6
Dwellings 29.7 44.2 29.2 31.6 27.9 27.4 29.4 21.5
Public
Administration 6.3 2.4 1.4 0.4 1.2 0.8 0.5 1.2
Other 8.4 12.9 14.7 13.4 15.9 14.6 13.2 15.3
Source: The Greek Economy in Figures, (1986) 
Electra Press and The Greek Economy 
Vol III, (1984)
the growth of the secondary sector which was not associated with 
a particularly large industrialisation of the country. In fact, 
as it has been pointed out, only the industries in which there 
was large foreign investment have shown over the years 
substantial growth rates without however pulling with them the 
rest of the economy.
All the aforementioned factors meant that either the country 
would remain stagnant or that it would relay heavily on foreign
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sources for financing her development. As we show, foreign 
capital did come into the country on a large scale, especially 
at the beginning of the 60s. This, of course, not only does it 
create dependency ties but also determines to a large extent the 
type of development and has a serious impact on the structure of 
the economy. Foreign capital would invest in those sectors of the 
economy that it considered most profitable with little or no 
attention for a proper articulation between the various sectors 
of the national economy. This would require a degree of 
government planning and intervention of the sort that successive 
post-war governments were unwilling or unable to undertake. Table 
2.12 below shows the sectoral distribution of fixed capital of 
foreign ventures in Greece. The degree of foreign control in the 
various sectors is also important. Measuring this degree of 
control Samaras (1982) gives the following information on it: 
Petroleum and petroleum products 96%, transport 60%, basic metals 
57%, chemical products 45%, electrical equipment 42%, plastics 
40%, wood and cork 37% and tobacco 27%. However, he does not 
explain how he derives the figures. He also points out that a 
similar situation is to be found in banking and 
finance.
Furthermore, the sectors that foreign capital has over the 
years shown a preference in investing, have on the whole tended 
not be antagonistic to sectors in the country of origin of the 
capital but complementary. As a result the underlying forces 
would be for the whole of the Greek economy to develop as a 
complementary one to the economies of the capitalist metropolis. 
Indeed, this tendency may be further strengthened with the
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accelerating West European integration. In fact it
Table 2.12 
Sectoral Distribution of Fixed Capital of Foreign Ventures (%)
1968
Food, Beverages, Textiles
Non Metal 1
Chemicals,
ic Minerals
Plastics,
Basic Metals
Machinery,
Other
Petroleum
and Metal Products
Electrical Machinery
7.
7.
37.
36.
4.
6.
9
2
6
9
3
I
1979
18.
15.
20.
21.
8.
16.
1
3
3
5
2
6
Source: Giannitsis (1985, p. 276)
can be observed that in the past few years very little industrial 
investment in new branches has taken place with the notable 
exception of establishment of the arms industry. Most investment 
appears to be directed in service sector activities, namely 
tourism. The technology used in foreign capital ventures would 
also tend to be comparatively capital intensive and perhaps 
inappropriate for local conditions and unable to absorb surplus 
labour from agriculture, hence the high rates of migration 
experienced in the fifties and sixties in Greece (Table 2.13). 
This labour flow meant that Greece could boast near full 
employment levels for a substantial part of this period. Had it 
not been for emigration however it is likely that the employment 
picture may have been substantially different.
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Table 2.13 
Emigration Flow 1955-1968
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
:al
Total
Emigration
28,787
35,349
30,428
24,521
23,684
47,768
58,837
84,054
100,072
105,569
117,167
86,896
42,730
50,866
836,728
Europe
No
6,068
7,780
13,046
6,567
6,713
26,927
39,564
60,754
74,236
79,489
87,242
53,050
15,658
23,501
500,595
USA, Australasia
%
20.4
22.0
42.9
26.8
28.3
56.4
67.2
72.3
74.2
75.3
74.5
61.0
36.6
46.2
59.8
Source:
No
19,766
23,147
14,783
14,842
13,871
17,764
17,336
21,959
24,459
25,327
29,036
33,093
26,323
25,891
307,597
Nicolinacos
%
66.4
65.5
48.6
60.5
58.6
37.2
29.5
26.1
24.4
24.0
24.8
38.1
61.6
50.8
36.7
(1976)
At the same time, given the ideological commitments of 
consecutive right wing governments to a laissez-faire system and 
the lack of any comprehensive long term planning, there were no 
measures taken to ensure at least some degree of technology 
transfer to other more backward sectors of the economy. 
Furthermore, importing foreign technology meant that there was 
no attempt to develop sources of locally generated technology. 
This had long term technological dependency consequences for the 
country. Consequences that still haunt any attempts to produce 
internationally competitive manufactured products. The case of 
the infant and problematic Greek defence industry comes to mind 
as such an example. As we will see in chapter six, it survives 
due to large government subsidies and secured orders from the 
Greek armed forces with little or no competition from other
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producers.
Perhaps indicative of the specific growth pattern of the 
secondary sector of the economy is its dependence on foreign 
sources for technology and capital equipment, and that many 
manufactured consumer goods are not produced locally and have 
to be imported. This is particularly true of products that 
require a certain degree of technological know-how such as motor 
cars, television sets, hi-fi systems, cameras and numerous 
electrical appliances. Table 2.14 gives the share of capital and 
manufactured consumer goods in total imports for the period 1962- 
86. Both of them regularly accounted for more than fifty percent 
of total imports.
Table 2.14
Share of Capital Goods and Manufactured 
Consumer Goods to Total Imports 1960-86
Year
Manufactured 
Capital Consumer 
Goods Goods
Manufactured 
Capital Consumer 
Year Goods Goods
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
17.2
20.6
27.8
18.8
21.7
25.2
24.6
26.3
26.3
27.5
29.9
30.1
32.6
28.8
27.3
28.4
26.5
31.6
29.9
26.2
29.0
29.5
29.0
27.3
27.5
28.1
26.5
23.5
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
27.2
30.4
27.8
28.4
27.5
24.4
22.4
19.5
20.5
20.0
17.8
18.3
20.7
20.3
23.6
24.9
26.7
27.4
25.6
20.6
22.5
24.6
24.4
22.7
23.9
29.8
Source The Greek Economy in Figures (1987), 
Electra Press and The Greek Economy 
Vol III, Bank of Greece (1984)
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Another important indicator of the weakness of the industrial 
base, and particularly the manufacturing sector of the economy, 
is the level of Greek value added in the gross value of the 
manufacturing sector's production. From table 2.15 we can see 
that in less than ten years there has been a sharp decline of 
value added in many branches of industry with a few exceptions. 
This is of particular importance since it may indicate a 
declining vertical integration of the industrial sector. It seems 
that indigenous manufacturing activities take place in fewer and 
fewer stages of the production process.
Table 2.15 
Value Added as % of Gross Value in Greek Industry
Food
Beverages 
Tobacco
Textiles
Clothing - Footwear 
Furniture
Publications
Leather products 
Other
Wood - Cork
Paper 
Rubber - Plastics
Chemicals
Petroleum products 
Non Metallic Minerals
Metal Industries
Metal products 
Machinery 
Electrical products 
Transport equipment
1973
25.7
33.2 
25.1
40.0
39.3 
45.9
51.2
29.1 
46.9
41.2
39.2 
49.2
46.3
26.2 
52.2
41.5
40.5 
42.7 
37.2 
55.5
1980
23.8
36.3 
24.8
38.1
42.7 
47.1
54.4
32.7 
48.3
36.4
27.1 
39.7
32.7
6.5 
41.6
25.9
34.7 
43.3 
34.7 
56.9
1980:1973
- 7.4%
-1- 9.3% 
- 1.2%
- 4.7%
-1- 8.7% 
+ 2.6%
+ 6.3%
+12.4% 
+ 3.0%
-11.6%
-30.9% 
-19.3%
-29.4%
-75.5% 
-20.3%
-37.6%
-14.3% 
+ 1.4% 
- 6.7% 
+ 2.5%
Source: Giannitsis (1985)
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The stages that manufacturing activity still takes place are
probably the latter stages of production which may imply that
manufacturing relies more and more on imports and that it is no
more than a mere assembly line of imported products. This
development is of particular importance for the purposes of our
study, since it would seem to point to substantial limitations
to the venture of setting up a fairly well articulated and
integrated arms industry. Noticeable is also the fact that
traditional sectors of low-tech consumer products show a better
performance than the sectors producing intermediate and capital
goods. For our purposes we should notice the slight increase in
value added in the transport equipment sector. This may be due
to the increased operations of the Hellenic Vehicle Industry
(ELBO, formerly Steyer Hellas) a company that, as we will see,
is an important part of the Greek defence industry and as such
has been the subject of substantial government subsidies and has
guaranteed state orders. Apart from supplying the armed forces
with jeeps, trucks, APCs and IFVs, as well as other transport
equipment it has also expanded in the civilian sector with
guaranteed orders from the state.
On a different level, very few controls on the activities of 
capital and particularly foreign capital meant that a substantial 
part of the profits made were exported and repatriated rather 
than reinvested locally to stimulate further development. As in 
the case of other countries it has been argued that overall there 
was a net outflow of capital from the country thus robbing her 
from much needed investment funds.
This, as well as the need to import most capital and
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manufactured consumer goods, have resulted in a permanent balance 
of payments deficit (Table 2.16). A situation that substantially 
hinders any attempt to solve on a more permanent basis the 
difficult economic problems of the country.
Table 2.16 
Trade and Current Account Balance 1962-1987*
Year
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Trade
Balance
-398
-436
-555
-685
-745
-697
-772
-884
-1,084
-1,302
-1,571
-2,800
-2,888
Current
Account
Balance
-106
-80
-205
-273
-264
-221
-247
-336
-402
-327
-368
-1,175
-1,212
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Trade
Balance
-3,036
-3,328
-3,887
-4,339
-6,178
-6,809
-6,697
-5,927
-5,386
-5,351
-6,268
-5,686
-6,942
Current
Account
Balance
-1,075
-1,091
-1,267
-955
-1,881
-2,216
-2,421
-1,885
-1,876
-2,130
-3,276
-1,772
-1,296
* Mil US $
Source: The Greek Economy in Figures, 
Electra Press (1987)
The question that needs to be addresed now, on the basis of 
the above overview and evaluation of the development of Greece, 
is how can the country's development be characterised. Fotopoulos 
(1975, 1985) argues that Greek development can be characterised 
as dependent development on the basis of the following four 
criteria:
a) Development based on the external market
b) Development that relies on foreign investment capital
c) Development dependent on foreign technology and know-how
50
d) Lack of a complete industrial base
As we have so far seen, the Greek case appears to satisfy all 
of the above criteria. Indeed, the dependent character of the 
Greek economy is accepted by most writers on the subject. The 
late industrialisation of the country in a way predetermined this 
dependent development.
Despite this, for many the growth performance of the Greek 
economy, on the basis of traditional growth indicators, has 
represented an example of a successful development story. Broadly 
speaking, three aspects of Greek development are of particular 
interest to development studies:
First, is the fact that, in a developing country, the 
development model followed relied to a large extent on the 
private sector. State intervention in the economy, although very 
extensive in many sectors, avoided any active and decisive 
role in two key fields of the development process: direct 
investment in productive activities and the creation of an 
indigenous technological base.
Secondly, the implementation of an open doors policy towards 
direct foreign investment and the import of technology in line 
with the most orthodox - liberal traditions in economic thinking 
which argue that growth and development can be attained on the 
basis of those policies.
Finally, the implementation of a policy of gradual integration 
of the national economy in the international one at a stage of 
relatively low level of development.
On the basis of traditional indices of development the
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performance of the Greek economy has been quite satisfactory. 
This can be interpreted as a success of the country's 
orthodox/liberal development model. However, the prolonged and 
deep economic crisis, that the country is suffering from since 
the mid seventies, also highlights the severe limitations of 
this model. The economy appears to lack the means which will 
enable it to overcome the structural problems it faces in order 
to enter a new, qualitative different phase of development and 
to achieve a new place in the changing international scene. In 
short, it seems that it lacks any major sources of internal 
dynamism, a consequence of the dependent character of the 
country's development.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have surveyed and discussed the post-war 
growth and development of the Greek socioeconomic formation. It 
was pointed out that relying on the various indices of 
development the performance of the Greek economy can be said to 
have been quite satisfactory. At the same time we highlighted the 
fact that the development model of the country has important 
limitations. These are currently manifested in the chronic 
structural economic crisis of the country.
Throughout our survey and discussion we drew attention to the 
levels of military spending during this period and drawn 
attention to possible factors that may have influenced this 
expenditure. We did not, however, try to relate these levels of 
defence expenditure to the actual growth performance of the
52
country. This will be attempted in a subsequent section of this 
study. Nevertheless, certain questions concerning this issue need 
to be stated here and thus act as a guide to the analysis that 
follows. Did military expenditure influence and in what way the 
growth performance of the Greek economy? What were the avenues 
through which growth was affected? Was there a substantial 
opportunity cost in the allocation of resources to defence? Or 
what were the factors that necessitated the allocation of 
resources to defence rather than to other more productive uses 
such as the creation of a better infrastructure or indeed for 
health and education?
It is to these issues that we propose to turn our attention 
now. We begin by discussing issues concerning the sources of our 
data and draw attention to problems concerning their accuracy. 
At the same time we will look at different quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of military expenditure in order to gain a 
fuller picture of the matter. This is done in the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
FACTS AND FIGURES
3.1 Introduction
When compared with the 19th and even the 18th centuries the 
20th century can be said to have been an "age of bloodshed". 
World War I took more than 8.5 million lives in direct 
casualties, the Second World War cost around 15 million lives. 
Counting war-connected civilian deaths the figures reach 40 
million for World War I and an even greater total for the Second 
World War.
The period since the end of the Second World War has been 
called by many a period of "relative peace". This essentially 
implies that during the past forty five years the major 
industrial countries have coexisted without a direct armed 
conflict. Furthermore, it is often argued that this relative 
peace between the major blocks can directly be attributed to the 
existence of nuclear weapons. They are regarded by a number of 
people as the prime factors deterring a Third World War taking 
place. But the deterrence that nuclear weapons may offer is for 
many others no credible deterrence at all. If in the present day 
balance of terror deterrence fails once it will probably fail for 
ever.
On the other hand, a very different picture emerges when one
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considers the number of post-1945 conflicts throughout the world, 
These have included revolutions, military coups, civil wars, 
inter state wars, which have either directly or indirectly 
involved the two major superpowers. Indeed it has been estimated 
that during this period of the so called "relative peace" more 
than 100 wars have been fought throughout the globe in which over 
30 million people have been killed. All these wars have been 
fought exclusively on Third World territory. The West was 
directly involved in 33 of them and the Eastern block in 18. 
Furthermore, during the same period, the volume of World Military 
Expenditures (ME) has been increasing constantly and has reached 
unprecedented levels in both developed and developing countries 
alike. The arms trade between countries is currently one of the 
most flourishing forms of international trade.
This upward trend in world ME is by no means a new phenomenon. 
Military expenditures have been increasing for many decades or 
even centuries. SIPRI, for example, estimates that world military 
expenditure in constant prices was in 1976 at least 30 times 
higher than it was in 1900.
A notable aspect of present day world ME is the increasing 
third world and developing countries share in the level of world 
military spending. Since the end of World War II, their military 
spending has shown an almost constant upward trend, generally at 
a much faster pace than that of developed countries. Recent 
developments in the sphere of international relations, however, 
with the new emphasis on cooperation rather than confrontation, 
will probably result in a slowdown in the rate of increase of 
world defence spending and may even lead to a fall in real terms.
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The unprecedented levels that world military spending has 
reached, moved the United Nations (UN) Committee for Development 
Planning to state that "the single and most massive obstacle to 
development is the world-wide expenditure on national defence 
activity" (Jolly, 1978, p.ix) and to call for the global 
re-allocation of resources from defence to development.
Before looking with more detail at world military expenditure 
levels and their distribution in terms of regions, alliances and 
countries, it is necessary to draw attention to the question of 
the sources of such information and their reliability.
3.2 Sources of Data
By its very own nature, military expenditure has a strategic 
importance which often means that many aspects of it, such as its 
level and content, are either not made public or that full 
information is not always available. On the grounds of national 
security, many governments deliberately publish only partial 
information on military expenditure, or, parts of their military 
spending are often included within different categories of 
government expenditure. There are also differences between 
governments on what actually constitutes military expenditure. 
There is not a standardised calculation of military spending that 
is accepted and used by all governments. Thus different items may 
be included in military figures by one country but excluded by 
another.This of course makes the comparison between countries 
particularly difficult. The differences concerning what actually 
constitutes military expenditure may be based on genuine
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conceptual reasons but, more often than not, such differences can 
be attributed to strategic considerations.
The above, are only a small part of the major issues and 
problems related to the reporting and use of military expenditure 
figures in studies of the topic. The extent of the problem can 
be better understood by looking at the 1975 UN General Assembly 
discussion, which emphasised four important points concerning the 
issue as summarised by Deger (1986, p.40):
a) The definition and scope of defence expenditure as well as 
disaggregated classification within the total military budget;
b) The deflation for price changes for military expenditure, 
and the choice of a suitable defence deflator to give a proper 
volume index of the defence effort;
c) Comparisons of military expenditure across countries, and 
comparable measures by which data expressed in national 
currencies can be converted to a common unit;
d) The valuation of resources used in the defence sector with 
due emphasis on economic systems and structures. This of course 
goes beyond the narrow confines of the problems concerning 
military expenditure as such, and indeed it is related to the 
major issues regarding the consequences of defence for the rest 
of the economy given its specific structural characteristics.
Differences also exist between the various international 
organisations which report on defence spending. These include 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London 
(IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the 
United Nations in the Disarmament Yearbook, the IMF in the
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Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. Not surprisingly, the 
data of these sources also differ because there are differences 
in the definitions of military expenditure. The definition of 
military expenditure used by SIPRI (1973) includes the following 
items:
1. Pay and allowances of military personnel.
2. Pay of civilian personnel.
3. Operations and maintenance.
4. Procurement.
5. Research and development.
6. Construction.
7. Pensions to retired military personnel.
8. Military aid.
9. Civil defence.
10. Paramilitary forces.
11. Military aspects of atomic energy and space. 
The NATO definition of military expenditure principally 
differs from that of SIPRI in its exclusion of civil defence 
from its definition of defence activities. The NATO definition 
of military expenditure includes the following items:
1. Outlays on military personnel.
2. Civilian pay and allowances.
3. Other equipment, supplies and operations (part).
4. Procurement of major equipment and missiles.
5. Other equipment, supplies and operations (including 
research and development).
6. NATO common infrastructure and national 
construction.
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7. Pensions to retired military personnel.
8. Other expenditures (including outlays on national 
conscription and some insurance and indemnity items 
for former military personnel).
Although there is a NATO standardised definition of military 
expenditure, not all member countries use exactly the same 
definition and there are variations to be found between NATO 
members. Furthermore, as Kennedy (1983, p.50) points out, the 
NATO definition itself does not take into account the economic 
effects of having conscript armed forces as opposed to volunteer. 
This is bound to understate the cost of defence in those 
countries that use conscription and, therefore, it understates 
the burden element.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that SIPRI for 
example bases its estimates to a certain extent on figures 
produced by NATO or individual member states despite the 
differences in definitions. In any case any organisation's 
figures are as good as the figures publicised by the respective 
governments and, as we have seen, there are good reasons as to 
why states may not wish to make public all the details concerning 
military spending.
It is apparent from the above discussion that data concerning 
military expenditures must always be treated with a certain 
degree of caution and as not being totally accurate. It is 
obvious that the discussion so far has by no means exhausted the 
subject of data sources and their reliability. However, it is not 
within the scope of this study to examine this issue to great 
depth and detail. The above discussion was intended to highlight
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some of the problems concerning the data that will be used 
throughout the study and how this may affect the calculations 
the results and the conclusions that will be reached. 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that, despite the 
aforementioned problems, the estimates made by organisations such 
as SIPRI, the ACDA and the IISS are fairly reliable albeit not 
totally accurate. In any case, they have to suffice in the 
absence of anything better.
Bearing in mind the above, we can now proceed to look in more 
detail at world military expenditure levels and their 
distribution between regions, alliances and countries.
3.3 Levels of World Military Expenditure
The levels of world military spending have been steadily 
increasing for many decades. It has been estimated that in 1976 
the level of world defence expenditure, measured in constant 
prices, was thirty times higher than in 1900. SIPRI data shows 
that in 1984 total world ME was approximately $800 billion (1980 
prices and exchange rates). From this, about $70-80 billion was 
spent on military related research and development worldwide. By 
1987 the level of world ME was estimated by ACDA to have passed 
the trillion dollar mark. At least 20% of the world's scientists 
and 25% of total world R & D are devoted to military related 
fields. The figures are probably even higher if we allow for the 
fact that much of such R & D is not declared by governments for 
military and strategic reasons. The picture provided by long term 
figures of world ME shows a constant upward trend for all regions
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in the world since the end of the Second World War, for both 
developed and less developed countries alike as it can be seen 
in tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Table 3.1 
World military expenditure, annual rates of change (%) 1976-85
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
NATO :-2.4 3.0 1.9 1.3 3.3 4.2 6.3 5.3 3.1 6.3
WTO : 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.4 2.8 3.1
Other
Europe: 4.7-0.2 1.4 5.4 2.7-0.6 2.8 1.9 1.3 2.3
Middle
East : 9.7-3.7-0.4 5.2 4.3 12.1 13.4 1.9-3.5-3.5
South
Asia : 13.4 -3.4 4.5 8.6 5.3 6.9 10.5 4.4 5.8 5.6
Far East: 9.1 7.1 10.1 3.7 5.2 6.2 6.4 3.3 3.1 5.7 
China : 10.0 -3.6 12.3 8.7-18.8-18.3 4.3 -5.2 -1.7-11.5
Oceania : -0.4 0.5 1.8 3.0 5.9 7.3 3.9 2.9 7.6 1.4 
Africa : 5.4 4.2 2.4 6.1 0.6-6.2 0.6 2.1-9.5-1.3
Central
America: 8.2 28.5 6.9 0.9 8.9 14.8 2.6 7.7 3.7 1.2
South
America: 10.1 7.4 -1.1 1.9 5.5 4.5 44.0-11.7 -6.1 -5.8
World
Total : 1.7 1.8 2.8 2.7 0.9 2.2 6.1 2.7 1.7 3.2
Source: SIPRI Yearbook (1986)
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Table 3.2
Regional ME of LDCs and DCs (US $ Mil)
Middle East
South Asia
Far East *
Africa **
Central America
South America
China
USSR
WTO (total)
USA
NATO (total)
OPEC
*: excl China 
**: excl Egypt 
***: data for 1972
1
1952
886
1,686
3,225
475
375
2,873
9,888
62,741
62,873
148,652
219,916
12,239***
2
1983
50,000
7,865
32,950
14,100
2,825
14,745
35,800
137,600
151,130
186,544
307,171
48,745
3
Ratio of 2 and
56.43
4.66
10.22
29.69
7.53
5.13
3.62
2.19
2.40
1.25
1.39
3.98
Source: SIPRI Yearbook (1985)
In table 3.2, particularly noticeable is the massive increase 
in defence expenditure by less developed countries of the Middle 
East, Far East and Africa. In fact, as we will presently see, the 
share of the Third World's military spending has increased 
dramatically in past decades. This is due to the fact that, all 
wars since the end of World War II have been exclusively fought 
in the Third World and almost exclusively by developing 
countries. From this table we can see that in the years between 
1952 and 1983 there has been a massive increase in the levels of 
ME in various regions of the Third World. For example, the Middle 
East multiplied its real military spending 56.4 times in these 
three decades, Africa's ME multiplied 29.7 times, South Asia's 
and China's four times, South America's five times, and Central 
America's ME rose seven times. Notable is the fact that, every
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single regional subgroup of the Third World had a higher 
proportional growth rate of ME in this period than the two 
superpowers and their allies among the developed countries. This 
of course, is largely due to the many wars that have taken place 
in the Third World throughout the post-war period.
Although rates of world ME growth vary from year to year, 
comparisons show that there has been a considerable acceleration 
of military spending in the first half of the eighties. The 
average annual rate of growth over the years 1980-1984 was 3.5% 
which is well above the yearly average of 2.4% for the previous 
four years, i.e. 1976-80. The annual real rate of growth of 
military expenditures for the 1972-82 period averaged 5.0% for 
developing countries and 2.4% for developed countries.
This growth, can to some extent be attributed to the US 
rearmament programme during the years of the Reagan 
administration and to a much lesser extent to increased military 
spending by other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. In fact, 
military spending in the US has been rising very fast - by about 
8.5% p.a. in real terms since 1980. In all, there was a 40% real 
increase in military spending over the years 1980-1984 and the 
share of defence spending grew from 23% to 27% of the federal 
budget by 1984 (Rubin and Frisvold, 1985). Furthermore, a further 
40% increase by 1989 was planned despite the huge budget deficit. 
With the cuts proposed by the Bush administration for most of the 
items of the Federal Budget it seems that this will not be 
realised. A further factor that already contributes to the slow 
down of defence spending is the new era in international
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relations which places more emphasis on understanding and co- 
operation between nations and on finding peaceful solutions to 
world conflicts. Much of this new-found detente can be attributed 
to the rapid changes taking place in the socialist block and the 
Gorbachev proposals for massive reductions in both nuclear and 
conventional weapons. Whether this climate of understanding and 
calm is going to be a permanent feature of international 
relations remains to be seen.
In the case of the other NATO countries the growth rates of 
ME have been roughly stable at around 2% yearly in the period 
1980-1984 with the exception of Britain where the average growth 
rate was about 6% partly due to the Falklands War (Table 3.3). 
The slower upward trend in ME in the European members of NATO may 
be partly due to their taking a rather calmer view than the US 
of the "Soviet threat", and partly to the fact that the economic 
objective of holding back the rise in public expenditure has been 
given primacy. In 1984 NATO's share of world ME was approximately 
49.6%, the Warsaw Pact's about 24.1% and the Third World's share 
was about 18% which represented a drop from the peak of 20% 
reached in 1982.
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Table 3.3
Estimated real growth of ME for NATO countries 
1978-86 (figures in percentages)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Canada 9
USA 0
Belgium 6
Denmark 3
France 5
FR Germany 4
Greece 2
Italy 4
Luxembourg 8
Nether 1. -3
Norway 7
Portugal 1
Spain
Turkey -8
UK 1
.8
.8
.6
.9
.8
.2
.1
.3
.7
.4
.0
.0
-
.4
.7
-2
1
2
0
2
1
-3
6
3
6
2
1
-11
5
.1
.0
.2
.6
.3
.3
.1
.3
.0
.0
.4
.5
 
.3
.5
2
2
2
0
1
1
-13
4
16
-2
1
8
3
5
.6
.1
.0
.9
.8
.4
.5
.6
.4
.7
.1
.4
 
.6
.9
3.7
5.0
0.9
1.1
2.4
1.2
18.3
2.1
3.4
1.1
1.0
-0.5
-
12.8
4.0
4.3
4.6
-3.3
2.9
2.1
-1.3
2.0
7.0
0.9
-0.4
3.9
0.1
 
9.3
4.3
7.3
5.8
-4.0
0.8
1.7
0.8
-8.8
2.2
2.2
-0.9
4.3
-3.8
2.2
-3.7
3.2
6.6
5.4
-4.3
-2.4
-0.3
-1.0
18.8
3.0
0.5
1.7
-3.7
-7.0
1.8
-4.5
4.5
2.9
2.4
-2.9
-2.4
-0.1
0.2
-0.8
3.6
-2.5
-1.2
15.2
1.2
3.2
4.8
0.1
3.1
3.2
0.0
-0.4
2.9
3.7
-6.8
3.0
11.5
2.6
-4.7
11.0
-5.8
14.6
0.7
TotalNATO
Europe 3.3 2.7 2.3 2.9 8.4 1.2 1.2 0.7 1.9
Total NATO 1.9 1.6 2.2 4.2 6.0 4.0 3.8 1.8 2.7
Source: SIPRI Yearbook (1987)
As already pointed out, an important aspect of world ME since 
the end of the Second World War is the relatively rapid rate at 
which defence spending has increased in the Third World. In 1984 
the share of Third World ME was about 18%. In 1976 the Middle 
East contributed about 29% of the total Third World ME, the Far 
East 26%, South Asia and South America 15% each, Africa 10% and 
Central America about 4%. Notable are also the variations of ME 
in different Third World countries. In 1974 Iran and Egypt alone 
accounted for 23% of the total Third World ME and together with 
Israel, India, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea accounted for 51%. 
The top thirteen Third World countries (out of 93 countries) , i.e
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the previous six plus Brazil, South Vietnam, South Africa, 
Pakistan, Taiwan, Iraq, and Kuwait in 1974 accounted for a 
massive 70% of the total Third World ME (SIPRI data). Table 3.4 
below shows the changes in the percentage distribution of ME in 
the world since the fifties.
Table 3.4 
Percentage distribution of world ME 1955-85
NATO (total) :
WTO (total) :
Third World :
Other Developed :
China :
1955
62
29
3
3
3
1960
62
27
5
3
3
1965
55
31
6
3
5
1970
49
33
8
3
6
1975
45
33
12
3
6
1980
46
25
18
3
7
1985
49
24
18
3
5
Source: SIPRI, Yearbooks
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show diagrammatically the upward trends 
of military spending. Figure 3.1 shows the trend in the Third 
World and various regional groups while Figure 3.2 shows the 
trend of ME in LDCs and OPEC countries as contrasted with that 
of the two major alliances NATO and WTO for 1952-1983. As already 
pointed out, the reason for this increase in the defence spending 
of LDCs is the fact that all conflicts throughout the post-war 
period have taken place on Third World soil.
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Figure 3.1: ME in LDCs and regional groups 1952-83
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Figure 3.2: ME in LDCs, OPEC, NATO, and WTO 1952-83
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3.4 Greek Military Expenditure
In our survey of the post-war development of Greece we have 
seen that, throughout this period, military expenditure levels 
were particularly high. Indeed, Greece belongs to the group of 
countries that tend to allocate a substantial part of their 
resources for military purposes. In fact, in recent years Greece 
has on average devoted more resources (ME as % of GDP) for 
defence purposes than any other European country as it can be 
seen from table 3.5 which also has other comparative information 
of defence expenditure in Europe in relation to other variables 
as well. Throughout the post-war period, Greek defence 
expenditure has followed a steady upward path as it will be seen 
in this section where the relevant data on military spending is 
brought together for a fuller picture to emerge. In our survey 
of the Greek socioeconomic development attention was drawn at 
what factors may have possibly influenced Greek military spending 
during particular periods. These factors will be addressed in a 
more systematic way in chapter five.
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Table 3.5
ME in European countries in relation to other variables!983-85
Military Expenditure (average 1983-85) as: 
$ per Rank $ per Rank As % of Rank 
capita order sq. km order GDP order
NNA*
Austria 126 17
Finland 237 12
Ireland 94 20
Sweden 420 5
Switzerland 323 9
Yugoslavia 109 19
NATO
Belgium 360 7
Denmark 325 8
France 511 2
FR Germany 437 4
Greece 284 11
Italy 194 13
Luxembourg 139 16
Netherlands 368 6
Norway 457 3
Portugal 78 21
Spain 185 14
Turkey 64 24
UK 521 1
WTO
Bulgaria 125 18
Czechoslovakia 178 15
German DR 317 10
Hungary 70 23
Poland 75 22
Rumania 49 25
*Neutral, Non-Aligned
11,409 14
3,451 25
4,695 23
7,745 20
50,472 6
9,783 16
115,097 3
38,527 8
51,237 5
107,316 4
21,293 11
36,654 9
18,556 12
129,260 1
5,779 21
8,656 18
14,162 13
3,951 24
119,914 2
10,162 15
21,599 10
48,978 7
8,029 19
8,815 17
4,720 22
1.2
2.0 
1.7 
2.7 
1.8 
5.0
3.1 
2.3 
4.1 
3.3 
6.9 
2.7 
1.1 
3.2 
3.0 
3.3 
3.3 
4.6 
5.3
3.1 
3.5 
4.6 
2.3 
2.6 
1.4
24
20
22
15
21
3
12
18
6
8
1
15
25
11
14
8
8
4
2
12
7
4
18
17
23
Source: SIPRI Yearbook (1987)
In 1953, at the start of the period that this study is 
concerned with, Greek military expenditure was $197 million. By 
1986 this had risen to $1320 million in constant prices as it can 
be seen in table 3.6. This represents more than a sixfold 
increase in defence expenditure.
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Table 3.6
Greek Military Expenditure 1953-86*
ME
197
211
216
281
247
242
251
266
258
262
268
Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
ME
279
302
327
422
492
557
603
638
680
679
650
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Year
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
*(in constant 1973 mil dollars)
ME
1043
1197
1447
1230
1262
1093
1294
1318
1202
1428
1417
1320
Source: SIPRI Yearbooks
From a different angle, military spending during this period 
has on average accounted for more than 5% of GDP (Table 3.7) and 
almost a quarter of all government expenditure for military 
purposes (Table 3.8). This has probably had an important effect 
on the country's development and growth performance during this 
period. The various channels through which this may have been the 
case will be examined later on in chapter eight.
70
Table 3.7 
Greek ME as a % of GDP 1950-87
Year ME % of GDP
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
6.0 
5.6 
5.3 
5.2 
5.5 
5.2 
6.0 
5.1
4.8
4.9 
4.9 
4.3 
4.1
Year ME % of GDP
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
3.9 
3.7
3.7 
4.5
4.8
4.9 
4.9 
4.9 
4.7 
4.2 
4.2
Year ME % of GDP
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
6.8
6.9
7.0 
6.7 
6.3 
5.7 
7.0 
6.9 
6.3 
7.2 
7.1 
6.1 
6.3
Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks
Table 3.8
Greek ME as a % of Government Budgetary Expenditure (GE)
1952-85
Year ME % of GE
1952 28.1
1953 27.5
1954 29.5
1955 29.4
1956 32.6
1957 29.6
1958 27.9
1959 26.4
1960 25.4
1961 23.1
1962 20.9
Year ME % of GE
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
18.8
19.2
19.0
21.8
21.6
21.2
20.6
19.1
18.4
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
ME of GE
24.5
26.6
24.7
25.8
25.3
24.0
22.9
21.6
21.1
18.6
18.3
16.3
Source: SIPRI Yearbooks, Government Budgets, 
Bank of Greece (various years)
As already mentioned, Greece has been a member of NATO since 
1952. To further stress the level of military expenditure by the
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country we only need to compare it with that of other members of 
the Alliance. From table 3.9 we can see that, when compared with 
other members of NATO, Greece has in recent years often allocated 
more resources for military purposes (as a percentage of GDP) 
than any other NATO member. The most important aspect of this 
comparison is that Greece has done so while its average per 
capita income is only about one third of that of the advanced 
countries of NATO. Indeed Greece, along with Portugal and Turkey, 
is one of the poorest members of the NATO alliance.
Table 3.9 
ME as a % of GDP in NATO
average
1975-84
Belgium
France
W . Germany
Denmark
Greece
G. Britain
Italy
Luxemburg
Holland
Portugal
Turkey
Norway
NATO Europe
3
4
3
2
6
4
2
1
3
3
5
3
3
Canada : 1
USA : 5
.3
.0
.4
.4
.6
.9
.2
.1
.2
.6
.0
.0
.7
.9
.9
1980
3
4
3
2
5
5
2
1
3
3
4
2
3
1
5
.4
.0
.3
.4
.7
.0
.4
.2
.1
.5
.3
.9
.7
.8
.5
1981
3
4
3
2
7
4
2
1
3
3
4
2
3
1
5
.5
.2
.4
.5
.0
.8
.5
.2
.2
.5
.9
.9
.8
.8
.8
1982
3.4
4.1
3.4
2.5
6.9
5.0
2.6
1.2
3.2
3.4
5.2
3.0
3.8
2.1
6.4
1983
3.3
4.2
3.4
2.4
6.4
5.3
2.7
1.2
3.2
3.4
4.8
3.1
3.8
2.0
6.6
1984
3.
4.
3.
2.
7.
5.
2.
1.
3.
3.
4.
2.
3.
2.
6.
2
1
3
3
2
3
7
2
2
3
4
8
8
2
5
1985
3.3
4.1
3.3
2.3
7.1
5.4
2.7
1.2
3.1
3.2
4.4
3.2
3.8
2.2
6.9
NATO average 4.7 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.6
Source: Flight no 39 March-April (1986)
The defence burden of Greece, and for that matter any other 
country, should not only be viewed in terms of the expenditure 
for such purposes. There are a number of other resources that
72
are also devoted to defence, not least of which is the human 
resources. Once again, Greece occupies the first place among 
NATO members. The ratio of the Greek armed forces to the 
economically active population is higher than any other single 
NATO country (Table 3.10) and this can also said to be a burden 
on the country's resources.
Table 3.10
Armed forces as a % of economically active population
in NATO, 1980-85
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Belgium
France
W. Germany
Denmark
Greece
G. Britain
Italy
Luxemburg
Holland
Portugal
Turkey
Norway
NATO Europe
Canada
USA
NATO average
2.
3.
2.
1.
6.
2.
2.
0.
2.
2.
4.
2.
2.
1.
2.
2.
8
0
4
6
1
2
4
8
5
3
4
6
8
0
9
8
2
3
2
1
5
2
2
0
2
2
4
2
2
1
2
2
.8
.0
.4
.6
.8
.2
.5
.8
.4
.3
.5
.5
.8
.0
.9
.8
2
3
2
1
5
2
2
0
2
2
4
2
2
1
2
2
.8
.0
.4
.5
.8
.1
.5
.8
.3
.3
.6
.6
.8
.0
.9
.8
2
3
2
1
5
2
2
0
2
2
4
2
2
1
2
2
.8
.1
.4
.5
.3
.1
.4
.9
.2
.4
.8
.6
.8
.0
.9
.8
2.
3.
2.
1.
6.
2.
2.
0.
2.
2.
4.
2.
2.
1.
2.
2.
7
0
4
5
1
0
4
9
2
6
7
5
8
0
9
8
2.7
2.9
2.4
1.4
6.2
2.0
2.5
0.9
2.1
2.6
4.6
2.5
2.8
1.0
2.9
2.8
Source: Flight no 39 March-April (1986)
Greece also has one of the longest in Europe compulsory 
military services for all males which currently is between 
nineteen to twenty three months depending whether the conscript 
serves in the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. Currently, her 
total armed forces are 170,500 men of which 130,000 are
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conscripts. To this we have to add the 101,000 men of para- 
military forces which includes 26,500 men in the Gendarmerie and 
70,000 part-time soldiers in the National Guard. From the 
2,357,000 available manpower 1,906,000 are also, under the 
current regulations, fit and eligible in case of general 
mobilisation for military service. The Hellenic Armed Forces are 
made up by three branches. The Hellenic Navy with 19,500 men of 
which 12,000 are conscripts and with about 20,000 reserves; the 
Hellenic Army with a manpower of 115,000 which includes 90,000 
conscripts and a number of NCOs and privates with a five year 
obligation and there are also 350,000 reserves; and the Hellenic 
Air Force with 35,000 men which includes 16,000 conscripts and 
7,000 civilian personnel with a reserve force of 20,000 men.
The fact that Greece has a conscript army needs also be taken 
into consideration when it comes to examining the defence burden 
of the country. A conscript army means that only nominal money 
is paid to the men in the services. Had the country relied on a 
volunteer service, then, her defence spending would probably be 
much higher than the current levels.
This section was intended to offer a small picture of military 
expenditure levels in the world and to focus on the case of Greek 
defence spending. It has been shown that such expenditure levels 
in the world have constantly been rising with few signs of a 
reversal of this trend in the immediate future. Recent 
developments on the other hand, particularly in superpower
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relations, may result, in the not so distant future, in a 
movement towards lower defence expenditure levels in the world. 
The sheer levels of all kinds of resources allocated to defence 
by the world make the issue of military expenditure a subject of 
particular interest to economics. Thus, in the next section we 
attempt a survey of how the issue of military expenditure has 
been addressed and analysed by economic theory with brief 
summaries of the main contributions on the subject.
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CHAPTER 4
MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC THEORY
It has been shown in chapter three that, the overall picture, 
as depicted by long term figures of world military expenditure 
(ME) , shows that through the years there is a constant upward 
trend in such spending and that in recent years this trend has 
accelerated even further. This acceleration of military spending 
in the world may to a large extent be attributed to the cold war 
climate that existed between the two major military blocks and 
the large number of regional conflicts in the early eighties. The 
new era in international relations that stresses cooperation 
rather than confrontation, will probably result in lower levels 
of military expenditures throughout the world. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that throughout modern history every nation 
state had some form of military institutionalised arrangements 
where resources and funds were channeled, and that ME uses up 
scarce resources of many kinds including science and technology, 
until a few years ago comparatively little detailed research was 
done as far as economics is concerned in this area. It was not 
until after the end of the Second World War that concrete 
research started on the subject of military spending.
This was mainly due to the fact that, up to that time, the
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prevailing economic methodology was mostly concerned with the 
allocation of resources through forces operating within a 
competitive market framework. Furthermore, only insufficient and 
inaccurate data was generally available due to the high secrecy 
surrounding military spending. However, after the Second World 
War due to greater access to estimates and figures of ME, the 
growth of the public sector and state expenditure in capitalist 
countries and the increasingly high costs of armaments due to the 
application of modern and expensive technology led to more 
concrete research and analysis of military expenditure. "War" has
become "far too serious a business to be left only to the
1 
generals".
Recent years have seen an attack by many Western governments, 
such as the Thatcher ones, on public expenditures and the public 
sector of the economy in general. Despite the massive cuts on all 
forms of public spending, many such governments were committed 
and actually presided over large increases in military 
expenditures in real terms. As Georgiou (1984) points out, 
several questions arise concerning the subject of ME in 
capitalist countries: What role does ME play in capitalism? Does 
it stimulate capitalism or does it contribute to its demise? How 
do economists analyse the arms race? Can ME and the arms race be 
analysed by economists independently of the socio-political 
dimension? And perhaps more importantly, can there be a general 
theory of ME and the arms race or are they historically 
contingent?
Our purpose here is to provide a small survey of how military 
expenditure is examined by the different theoretical approaches
and how different writers of different schools of thought analyse 
military spending.
4.2 Classical Contributions
Despite the lack of concrete and extensive analysis on the 
subject of military spending and warfare up to the end of the 
Second World War by economists, references and discussions on 
this subject can be found in the works of various classical 
writers.
For example, in book V of "The Wealth of Nations" (1776) Adam 
Smith regards military spending as one of the "legitimate" forms 
of public expenditure. He regarded the provision of defence as
being the most important duty of the sovereign. He wrote: "the
2 first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from
the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be 
performed only by means of a military force. But the expense both 
of preparing this military force in time of peace, and of 
employing it in times of war, is very different in the different 
states of society, in the different periods of improvement" 
(Smith, 1776, book V, p.213). He then proceeded to derive the 
necessity for a paid defence force in the society. For him 
society is faced with a basic choice between some form of part- 
time military organisation, such as a militia, and a permanent 
standing army. This, according to Smith, is not to be decided on 
the basis of which is cheapest but rather on the basis of which 
is most suited to adequately protect society from external 
threats. In his view militias were less efficient than standing
armies since they exercised less often and were together for 
shorter periods. In the case of a standing army on the other 
hand, civilian attitudes dissolve and the individual members are 
transformed by disciplined combination into fighting units. In 
short they become professional soldiers rather than amateurs. 
Smith also drew attention to the ever increasing costs of 
providing weapons, due to the advances in technology and the 
continuous introduction of new and more modern weapons. Thus, 
training in the use of new weapons and war itself become ever 
more expensive. This led him to the question of how the 
increasing expenses of defence can be met. In his view, the 
defence of the society was for the common good and thus it would 
be reasonable to expect to be met by all the members of the 
society, each contributing according to his/her ability.
Smith, writing after the English-French Wars of 1756-63, also 
recognised that "great fleets and armies" were the model of 
"unproductive labour". After the more lethal European Wars of the 
1790's another classical economist Jean-Baptiste Say, writing 
critically from the French side about war and its causes, added 
to Smith's view: "Smith calls the soldier an unproductive worker; 
would to God this were true! for he is much more a destructive 
worker; not only does he fail to enrich society with any product 
and consume those needed for his upkeep, but only too often he 
is called upon to destroy uselessly for himself, the arduous 
product of others' work" (in Kennedy, 1983, p.13). In his work 
J. B. Say introduced into the economics of war the important idea 
of human capital. For him, the loss of human life was not the 
only loss brought about by war. He also considered the losses of
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the future in the form of foregone earnings and contribution to 
society's wealth that an early death brings about: "War costs 
more than its expense; it costs what it prevents from being 
earned" (ibid, p.13).
Another classical contribution to the issue of defence is to 
be found in Ricardo's works. His approach however, differed to 
that of Smith. Ricardo was mostly concerned with restraining 
governments from embarking on costly wars at public expense. His 
main contribution was on the issue of war finance and his 
proposals aimed to meet his objective of restraining the 
tendencies he saw in governments to become involved in 
unnecessary military conflicts with other states. For him, wars 
can be financed in two main ways: either by loans or by taxes. 
The ability of governments to raise finance for wars through the 
creation of public debt was in his opinion an unnecessary evil 
increasing the risks of wars for frivolous reasons, or wicked 
ambition or, worse, for financial gain. He argued that 
governments prefer loans as a means of financing war because this 
shifts the burden of the cost to the future. In his opinion the 
way to finance war was by taxes only and thus impose the burden 
on the present. Vast loans secured in the future, enabled 
governments to get into wars without restraint. On the other hand 
extra taxes that need to be agreed upon by Parliament first act, 
in Ricardo's view as a restraint.
Malthus also dealt with the subject of war, which he regarded 
as one of the inevitable checks on population and he saw the 
cause of war originating in the search for food and 
living space.
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Up to the First World War military matters were considered 
to be the exclusive province of the military. This, however, 
ended with the War which as Kennedy (1983) points out 
"established the connection between military power and the 
industrial system: without the latter the former was meaningless. 
Whichever side sustained the largest force and weight of 
armaments would be the last on its feet" (ibid, p. 15). As a 
result of this change early twentieth century writers such as 
Hirst (1916) and Pigou (1921) also studied the problems of war 
efforts.
Hirst (1916) was alarmed by the cost of modern armies and war 
efforts pointing out that even during periods of peace the costs 
of weapons were rising faster than the general wealth of society. 
He also highlighted the importance that industry and industrial 
products play in winning modern wars. Wars came to depend more 
and more on the products of science rather than pure manpower. 
But, most importantly, Hirst made an early reference to what 
later came to be known as the military industrial complex writing 
that "unseen agencies kill or maim men by the thousand" (ibid, 
p. 3). This point was further developed by him when he addressed 
the question of the role of the private armaments industry noting 
that "the armament tree has now grown until its leafy 
ramifications throw shadows over all the world". The competition 
for new markets between arms producers has intensified so much 
that even in the most backward countries one can find a market 
for the most modern weapons produced by the large arms
manufacturers who nevertheless "also co-operate from time to time 
for the purpose of stimulating the demand or raising prices" 
(ibid, p.92). He then embarked on a strong criticism of what 
today we would refer to as the military industrial complex and 
its interests. It is interesting to follow his argument since, 
despite the fact that it was written more than half a century 
ago, it still sounds surprisingly contemporary. Hirst argued 
that since the demand for weapons is always greatest during war, 
then, it can be said that war is the ultimate aim of the arms 
industry; or, if not the actual aim, then it is their raison 
d'etre: "the end and purpose for which they exist" (ibid, p.94). 
Thus, although mankind's interest clearly lies in peace with the 
minimum possible level of armaments, those in power, acting in 
the interest of the large arms producers, create arms races which 
are bound to lead to war. He observed that due to the ever 
increasing costs of war, and due to representative democracy, 
which has given people some small control over their rulers, 
perpetual warfare has been abandoned. Nevertheless, the large 
arms producers in order to secure lasting demand for their 
products need "to persuade the taxpayer that he requires 
armaments" and to achieve this "he must be shown that other 
nations are a menace. If one enemy flags in the race another can 
usually be found, and if there is a temporary lull in the trade 
a panic can be worked up with marvelous rapidity. Diplomacy 
working behind the scenes with the directors of this trade and 
the allied press is an invaluable aid at times when economic 
exhaustion or peace movements threaten business" (ibid, p. 94- 
95). His observations are surprisingly contemporary. They bring
to mind the sometimes mass hysteria, summarised in the Cold War 
expression "reds under our beds", generated by governments and 
press alike, which is then used to justify the vast amounts spent 
on military preparations. More recently, the Reagan 
administration in the US justified its increased military 
spending by discovering or rediscovering "enemies" of the US in 
every corner of the globe.
Hirst also gathered statistics concerning the arms race 
between the major powers and he argued that in no way could such 
expenditure be productive. For him, military spending had an 
important adverse effect on the economy and ultimately slowed 
down growth. He also addressed the paradox of this waste of war 
and the economic prosperity that it seems to come with it. He 
concluded that war prosperity was a fictitious stimulus to 
economic activity, because once the stimulus is withdrawn "an 
augmented quantity of labour is left to compete in the market 
with a greatly diminished quantity of capital" (ibid, p.151).
Pigou (1921 and 1940) addressed the issue of the costs of 
maintaining a modern army in relation to the possible benefits 
that military service and training may have. He argued that 
whatever benefits may result from this they are probably more 
than outweighed by the loss of the corresponding benefits that 
would have otherwise have resulted if people were engaged in 
civilian economic activities. On the issue of the role of the 
big arms producers he notes among other things that due to "the 
private interest of makers of armaments ... they desire 
preparations for war ... it is to the interest of all of them 
to promote war scares and international competition in armaments"
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(ibid, p.23), an argument very similar to that of Hirst (1916). 
He also extensively discussed the question of the financing of 
war, arguing that, most economic arguments he examined, pointed 
to the financing of war by taxation: "It is plain that the 
general trend of the various considerations set out so far points 
towards the financing of war by taxation rather than by 
(domestic) loans" (ibid, p.84). At the same time, however, he 
pointed out that, since wars may last for a number of years, 
taxation may discourage the extra work effort required by the 
population during the years of the conflict in spite of any 
patriotic stimulus that wars may generate.
Durbin (1939) reports that his work was the result of meetings 
with other five people which begun in 1936 "when the probability 
of another war with Germany became exceedingly great" (p.17). He 
argued that the technics of modern warfare are greatly influenced 
by science and technology. For him winning a war very much 
depends on the technological, industrial and financial strength 
of the country rather than the size of her armies. Thus during 
periods of war it is necessary for the government to try to 
mobilise the industrial and financial resources needed for the 
war effort, and divert them from civilian to war use. He proposed 
"six guiding principles for resource mobilisation": a rapid 
increase in taxation; direct control of industry; an expansion 
of the money supply; low rates of interest for government 
borrowing; control of lending in the private banking sector; and 
compulsory direct lending by banks to the government (ibid, p. 75- 
84) . At the same time, however, he recognised the possible risks 
that such policies may encompass. Heavy taxation could cause
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"psychological discouragement and accompanying deflation in the 
private sector industry"; there may not be time to create an 
efficient control of industry by the civil service; the economy 
could be "swept up into an opening spiral of uncontrollable 
inflation"; and forced lending was an unpopular expedient" (ibid, 
p.102-104) .
4.4 The Neo-classical School
Military spending is regarded by the Neo-classical (N-C) 
School as one of the legitimate forms of public expenditure. For 
neo-classical economists military expenditure (including security 
spending) represents a classic example of a pure public good 
supplied by the state. The characteristics of a public good 
being:
a) It is undepletable, in the sense that its provision to one 
consumer does not reduce the provision available to another;
b) It is supplied in equal amounts to all consumers;
c) It is non-excludable, in the sense that once the good or 
service is provided to one section of the community it does not 
exclude other sections of the community from consuming it. 
Defence expenditure fulfills all these characteristics.
On the whole, N-C analysis of military expenditure accepts 
that the state must take appropriate defence steps in order to 
protect some well defined national interests against the 
possibility of aggression from a known potential enemy. The 
creation of the appropriate military precautions against such 
an aggression will act as a deterrent against a potential enemy
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and will also help to preserve the peace by maintaining a balance 
of power.
Therefore, if one assumes the existence of a potential enemy, 
the state must have the capability first to deter aggression and, 
in case this should fail, to be able to defend the threatened 
national interests. It is also accepted that the supply of 
resources for military purposes has an opportunity cost of 
foregone investment or consumption or other uses and that the 
exact amount of resources that will be used for such purposes is 
determined by preferences between national security and 
investment or consumption of those resources. Such preferences 
are determined by economic, political, and social and military 
factors. The question, therefore, is how to get the optimum and 
desired defence capability at a minimum cost given the level of 
military technology.
Broadly speaking, ME is regarded as being a necessary function 
of the state and a problem of calculating an optimum policy given 
certain information and a known objective. Furthermore, the level 
and form of ME is mostly determined by the known objective of 
defence against a potential enemy of the national interests.
Of course, implicit in this approach, is the assumption that 
the state is a rational class-neutral actor balancing opportunity 
costs and security benefits in order to maximise some national 
interests to the benefit of all classes and social groups. It 
seems also that the existence of a potential enemy is taken for 
granted and war or aggression is assumed to be endemic to society 
because of the also assumed aggressive nature of man.
However, despite the fact that expenditure for military
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Warsaw Pact countries for the period 1953-S6 using multiple 
regression analysis and a two country model. We take the USSR and 
the Warsaw Pact countries (WTO) as the other "country" in our 
analysis. In line with the model, we would expect the constant-
grievance term to enter the equation with a positive sign, the 
fatigue coefficient to be negative and the defence-reaction 
coeffients to be positive. The following results were obtained: 
(1) DME - +73.763 
(0.74S) 
2 
R = 0.049 
(2) DME - +75.S0S 
(0.797) 
2 
R = 0.052 
+0.117 GR 
(1. lIS) 
s.e = 110.S6 
+0.125 GR 
(1.162) 
s.e - 114.22 
-0.0021 USSR 
(0.772) 
ow = 2.09 
-0.002 WTO 
(0.S29) 
ow = 2.0S 
F-stat - 0.805 
F-stat - 0.S52 
where DME : the change in Greek military spending i.e x1-xO 
GR : Greek military spending in constant prices (US 
million dollars) 
USSR: Soviet military spending in constant prices ($ mill) 
WTO : Warsaw pact military spending in constant prices 
($ mill) 
(the figures in brackets give the t statistic; and 
all military spending measured at constant 1973 prices.) 
For each variable in the equations, the coefficient and the 
t-statistic (in brackets) are reported. As regards the overall 
equation performance, the R-squared, the standard error of the 
regression, the Durbin Watson and the F-statistic diagnostics are 
reported here and throughout this study (see Appendix I for an 
outline of what each one indicates). 
The resul ts obtained in our calculations are very 
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issues at stake which should be borne in mind. It is not only a 
matter of how to measure and compare the defence expenditures of 
the various countries involved and their contribution to the 
common defence but there are questions such as: What is that 
level of defence that guarantees Western security? How is the 
defence burden defined? What does it actually comprises? Does it 
include the defence of the NATO area only (in reality Western 
Europe) or it also includes efforts to promote Western interests 
outside the immediate NATO area? How can such interests be 
defined? What do they include? By what means are such interests 
going to be promoted or defended? 
Addressing the question of burden sharing implies the 
existence of a minimum degree of consensus on such issues. It 
will not be wrong to say that such a consensus does not currently 
exist among the NATO allies. 
In a study concerning the issue of burden sharing among the 
allies in NATO, Lunn (1983) discusses the issue to some detail 
and points to the problems of burden sharing that face the 
allies. He points out that at the core of the debate among the 
western allies are disagreements mainly between the USA and the 
Western European members of NATO. Those are reflected in US 
beliefs that west European countries are not doing enough for 
their own defence and that in a sense they are free riders at the 
expense of the us. On the other hand the Western Europeans often 
have doubts about the wisdom of US defence policies. He argues 
that it may be necessary for the allies to address more 
fundamental issues than simply burden sharing and discusses the 
possibility of the evolution of a more independent European 
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such markets of traditional arms producers. The sale to the Royal 
Air Force of the Brazilian Tucano trainer is one such example. 
The annual value of the production of major weapons in Third 
World and peripheral countries has grown constantly since 1950. 
In 1950 production was valued at about $2.3 million. In 1984 this 
had risen by about 500 times in constant 1973 prices. However, 
despite this sUbstantial growth, arms production in the Third 
World is still limited. Most of these countries still remain 
dependent upon the developed ones for a sUbstantial part of their 
weapons, usually those that require the use of advanced 
technology. Nevertheless, their own defence industries are 
growing fast. It is estimated that such countries, in 1980, 
accounted for about 1.5 to 2 per cent of the global production 
of major weapons. Worth noticing is the fact that their arms 
exports have increased tenfold since the mid 70s. The emergence 
of Third World countries as arms producers may also partly 
explain the recent slump in total world trade to $40 billion in 
1984, down from $50 billion in 1982. 
In the 50s only five or so Third World countries - Argentina, 
Egypt, India, Cambodia, North Korea were serious arms 
producers. Today about 27 such countries are competing with 
advanced countries in the international arms market. Eleven of 
them sell fighter aircrafts, nine sell ships, six sell missiles. 
Brazil, the South's biggest arms exporter, sells almost half of 
all armoured fighting cars outside the socialist bloc. It is 
estimated that she sells more arms than coffee and her arms 
exports are estimated to be worth more than her defence budget. 
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It has been reported that weapons from Brazil will soon go into 
production under licence in the US where companies plan to build 
a Brazilian designed armoured car and aim to start a joint 
development of a new tank in the 1990s. From the Third World arms 
producers, eight countries account for more than 90 per cent of 
weapons output and nearly half originates from Israel and India. 
South Africa, Brazil and Taiwan account for another 17 per cent; 
North Korea, Argentina and South Korea for about 18 per cent and 
Egypt and the Asian countries for a further 4 per cent. The rest 
is shared by 12 Third World producers. From 1965 up to about 1979 
India was the biggest such producer. In the early 70s however, 
Israel and South Africa raised weapons output sharply and Israel 
currently leads India. 
The Israeli arms industry now meets 96 per cent of domestic 
requirements and sophisticated missiles account for about 25 per 
cent of total arms output. The Lavi (before the project was 
scrapped) and Kfir fighter planes, designed and produced locally 
are on a par with the advanced US F-15 and F-16 fighters. 
However, it should be pointed out that the almost unl imi ted 
access to US technology and know how has greatly helped in the 
development of the Israeli defence industry. In the case of South 
Africa the international arms embargoes of 1963 and 1977 failed 
to stop the country's arms buildup. with its highly developed 
industrial base and strong financial and technological resources 
Pretoria has been able to design and develop its own arms. In 
contrast to the previous two, Taiwan depends on foreign 
technology for arms production. About 85 per cent of the total 
arms output between 1968 and 1984 was produced locally under 
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licence. 
Finally, we should note that although arms production, in 
what is nowadays known as the Third World, has been increasing 
in recent years it is by no means a new phenomenon. In the 19th 
century small arms and warships were produced in a number of 
those countries. Advances in arms production technology around 
the turn of the century resulted in those arms producing 
countries in the Third World being overtaken by the 
industrialised countries. Arms production in those countries 
increased again in the 1930s because the global economic crisis 
stimulated import substituting manufacturing in many peripheral 
countries. The Second World War however generated extremely rapid 
developments in military technology in the advanced countries and 
thus the technological gap in this area was firmly established. 
But arms production in the periphery gained a new momentum during 
the second half of the 60s and we are now witnessing an 
internationalisation in arms production and the penetration of 
big capital in the defence sectors of the economies of peripheral 
countries. 
Before this is discussed further, we first turn to discuss 
the motives for the establishment of domestic arms production 
facilities in peripheral countries. 
6.4 Motives for Arms Production 
-------------------------------
For a number of internal and external reasons that have been 
discussed in chapter two, all states no matter how small maintain 
armed forces. There are two main ways in which demand for weapons 
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can be met. Arms can be either bought from abroad or produced 
domestically. Since the two options are not mutually exclusive 
a country can opt for a combination of both. At most, as Platias 
(1984) points out, any given state has four alternatives for 
weapons acquisition: it may purchase weapons from one or several 
suppliers who can either be located at home or abroad. These four 
alternatives are shown on figure 6.1. Clearly, whichever 
alternative a country chooses it must involve some costs and 
benefits of economic, political and military nature. This still 
applies if the country opts for a combination of the four 
alternatives. 
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Figure 6.1: Alternatives for Weapons Acquisition 
Number of Suppliers 
One 
Total Foreign 
Concentration 
(Type A) 
Total Domestic 
Concentration 
(Type C) 
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Several 
Diversification among 
Foreign Suppliers 
(Type B) 
Diversification among 
Domestic Suppliers 
(Type D) 
For many years many developing or peripheral countries have 
relied for their military hardware on imports and for a few of 
them type A of weapons acquisitions applied. In the case of 
Greece, for example, the US was almost the exclusive supplier 
of the Hellenic Armed Forces up to the early seventies. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that even today the large majority 
of weapons in the inventory of the Hellenic Armed Forces is of 
US origin. As it has already been pointed out, recent years have 
seen an increasing trend in indigenous arms production by many 
peripheral countries. This was based at the beginning on foreign 
patents and know-how, and later in indigenously developed 
patents. Nowadays, all types of conventional weapons are being 
produced in countries outside the industrial centres ranging from 
the most basic weapons and ammunitions to highly sophisticated 
jet aircrafts and guided missiles. The different types of weapons 
produced by such countries reflect, to a certain extent, varying 
military requirements, technological capabilities as well as 
different political and economic goals. This process of arms 
production has advanced so much that there are now clear 
indications that a number of these countries are actively 
pursuing the development and production of nuclear weapons, 
thereby violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such countries 
are Israel, India, South Africa, Pakistan, Brazil. Indeed, for 
Israel, there is enough evidence to suggest that it is already 
in possession of nuclear weapons and this may also be true for 
India and South Africa. Pakistan is reportedly actively pursuing 
the development of what is termed the "Islamic Bomb". This may 
become in the future a source of particular worry for Greece 
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given the close ties between Pakistan and Greece's adversary 
Turkey. 
Clearly, by its very nature, arms production is expected to 
be motivated by political, economic, security and military 
factors. Perhaps the most common reason behind the decision to 
produce domestically all or part of the required arms by a 
country is the wish to seek a degree of independence and relative 
self sUfficiency in arms. To a large extent this is due to the 
fact that weapons .suppliers and especially the major powers 
often use arms supplies as instruments of national policy. They 
can use them as means of exerting pressure and influence over the 
recipient country especially in times of conflict. 
There are six major suppliers of arms internationally: the 
USA, USSR, UK, France, West Germany and China. Between them they 
account for about 90 per cent of the international arms trade. 
Ayres (1983) points to three main factors that may determine the 
arms supply policies of the supplying state: 
a) The hegemonic factor, which may influence the flow of arms 
from the supplier with the aim of achieving or maintaining a 
position of hegemony or domination over the recipient country 
or in the region. 
b) The industrial factor, which refers to the economic 
advantages of arms sales which may result in large scale 
production runs of the particular weapon. 
c) The restrictive factor, whereby the supplier may refuse to 
provide any arms or certain types of weapons if it is felt 
that this may turn to be against any of the interests of the 
supplying state. 
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her industrial and human capital base. It seems, therefore, that 
Greece has not yet fully exploited her potential for defence 
production. In order to assess further the country's capability 
for domestic production of arms we proceed to examine in more 
detail the PDC industries and their relative importance in the 
manufacturing sector of the country. 
As we have seen there are seven three-digit or major group 
categories within the International standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) that encompass those industries that are 
important for arms production. 
They are: 1) Iron and steel (29 sub-categories) 
2) Non-ferrous metals (33 sub-categories) 
3) Metal products (15 sub-categories) 
4) Machinery (64 sub-categories) 
5) Electrical machinery (32 sub-categories) 
6) Ship-building and repairing (4 sub-categories) 
7) Motor vehicles (10 sub-categories) 
For these branches of the Greek manufacturing sector we will 
examine their employment, gross output and value added levels and 
share in total manufacturing in order to assess their 
contribution and relative importance. The first data that we will 
look at is for 1975 since it was in the mid seventies that the 
first attempts to establish an arms industry in Greece were made. 
Thus it will be useful to know the state of the PDC sectors at 
the time in order to draw some conclusions as regards the effects 
of the attempts to establish an arms industry. Table 6.6 shows 
the size of the PDC industries and their share in total 
manufacturing in terms of employment, gross output and value 
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opposite of this has actually taken place. But, as Smith, Humm 
and Fontanel (1984) point out, governments and arms producers are 
tightly coupled even when the particular firm is not 
nationalised. This produces strong counteracting forces to the 
above tendencies. These counteracting forces not only include 
large government subsidies for domestic producers but we have 
also to allow for the strong desires of many countries to 
diversify supply sources and thus reduce the degree of 
dependency. Thus "the end result is a buyers market with excess 
supply from many high cost producers" (ibid, p. 9). Important 
qualitative changes can also be observed during this period. 
There is a steady rise in the importance of co-production and 
offset agreements and counter trade (barter) arrangements as 
important components of any major weapons purchase. 
7.4 Motives for Arms Transfers 
------------------------------
The question that needs to be addressed now is what are the 
reasons influencing military transfers from the point of view of 
both participants. Whynes (1979) points out that in the case of 
the suppliers, usually the developed countries, there may be two 
factors in operation: a) the hegemonic, aiming to gain political 
and economic advantage and influence in the recipient country, 
possibly at the expense of other potential suppliers with 
competing political and/or 
. 
economlC interests; and b) the 
economic factor, to assist their own industry and export trade. 
Thus, once a country has decided on maintaining a domestic arms 
industry for the variety of reasons already discussed in the 
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